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The End Game: The Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Dispute and Settlement

By Eric Hyer

First published in Vietnam Journal, January 2003 issue

An image appeared here in the original.

Introduction

The central question of this paper is, How does the PRC approach boundary disputes and how has this pattern influenced the Sino-Vietnamese boundary settlement? That a boundary dispute even existed was usually unknown until bilateral relations between China and the other party to the dispute deteriorated. For example, as late as 1975, many were confident that the Sino-Vietnamese boundary was mutually acceptable, but in 1979 a border war erupted[1]. Similarly, China raised boundary questions with India and the Soviet Union publicly only after the deterioration in bilateral relations. A related question is, Under what circumstances do territorial issues become part of Beijing's "agenda," to be contested or resolved? One China scholar found it "not surprising" that despite the "rather stable boundary for the past thousand years," it took Beijing and Hanoi fifty years after establishing diplomatic relations to conclude a land boundary settlement in December 1999, after a Awild ride on the end of the pendulum of Sino-Vietnamese relations.[2]

The second major question is, When settling boundary disputes, to what extent is China motivated by strategic goals (e.g., to weaken another power's influence with neighboring states or enhance China's security by developing alliances to counter the growing power of other states)? Related questions are, Why has China been able or willing to settle in most cases but not in others? What factors determine China's willingness to compromise?

A larger issue for China scholars is to develop better theoretical explanations of China's foreign relations. Often scholarship on China is richly descriptive inductive analysis. However, it is important that an explanation follows this rich empirical description in an attempt to develop good theoretical generalizations. This is an important process in developing theory. The end goal is a theoretical explanation of empirical regularities. This task continues to confound students of Chinese foreign policy with no widely accepted general theory of Chinese foreign relations. Scholars have developed islands of theoretical explanations of certain aspects of China's behavior, offering important insights into China's foreign policy[3]. Nevertheless, the study of China's foreign affairs remains largely descriptive, relegating studies of China's foreign policy to the fringes of political science and international relations.

Theories developed to explain China's foreign policy have largely assumed a rational choice theoretical model due in part to the opaque nature of China's domestic politics and especially the foreign policy making process. Other models have adopted historical and cultural perspectives. In this paper, I will develop a model that combines a rational choice model with insights on leadership perception in an attempt to provide a hypothesis on China's approach to boundary disputes and settlements. I will then use this model to explain the Sino-Vietnamese boundary dispute and recent agreements. This also will provide a preliminary test case of the hypothesis.

Advocates of rational choice models argue that they "are not interested in explaining a particular agent's behavior, but in the general regularities which govern the behavior of all agents." This view is rationalized by arguing that "it is not the agents psychologies which primarily explain their behavior, but the environmental constraints they face."[4] However, others argue that the "logic of rational calculation" is constrained by "subtler ideational logics" that we cannot explain without taking into consideration cultural and historical perspectives, and decisionmaking theories gleaned from psychology[5].

Tension exists between these structural determinist and constructivist or ideational approaches to theorizing about international relations and foreign policy. Rational choice theorists are concerned that dense description will diminish theoretical parsimony, while others are concerned that general explanations neglect the domestic and ideational factors and nuanced analysis of a particular country's foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz, a well-known critic of constructivist or ideational theories, argues that "if the aims of states become matters of . . . central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be drawn.[6]" Robert Jervis attempts to bridge this structural determinist- decisionmaking divide with a two-step model in which agents' perceptions depend on their understanding and images of the international system; what Jervis calls the "psychological milieu," focusing on the decisionmakers goals, calculations, and perceptions. Decisionmakers' perceptions are one of the immediate factors in their policy preferences. Nevertheless, the images they have of the international system also are important factors in determining policy decisions[7].

Hypothesis on China's Boundary Settlements

Developing a hypothesis on China's boundary settlements cannot be achieved by only studying China's specific policy toward a particular boundary dispute in an idiosyncratic (or sinocentric) way. The impact of the structure of the international system upon China's behavior must be considered. This structure conditions China's calculations, foreign policy, and interactions with other states[8]. For foreign policy decisionmakers, the structure of the international system is an independent variable in relation to their perceptions of the international environment[9]. The constraints of the "regularities" of the international system limit China's foreign policy elites' options. According to Waltz, "Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.[10]" Thus, we can assume that China's behavior follows certain predictable patterns[11]. As a particular balance of power changes, we expect China's behavior to change, thus showing a continuity in the pattern of China's behavior determined, in part, by the structural constraints of the international system. At the same time, we must keep in mind the images leaders hold of the international system and how this affects their perceptions and particular policy preferences, something generated within people's minds, not dictated by outside structures, but by the image of these structures.

I treat China's understanding of a particular boundary dispute as a dependent variable of the balance of power and China's threat perception. This general context determines Beijing's relationship with the other party to the dispute, and its desired relationship influences the policy Beijing adopts toward a particular boundary dispute. China's relationship with the country involved in the dispute largely determines its perception of the fundamental nature of the dispute. Robert Jervis has pointed out that, the actor must decide whether an issue is highly situation-bound or whether its is a symptom of a disagreement that will continue to produce friction even if the initial dispute is settled. If the latter is the case, dealing with the dispute "on its merits" is not likely to be an effective strategy, and even successfully solving the specific problem will do little good. If . . . an agreement is reached, the chances of avoiding future conflicts will not have been greatly reduced. If, on the other hand, the actor feels that the basic issues can be ameliorated, he will usually be well advised to try to set relations on a more cooperative footing rather than to negotiate about the narrow issue that is the immediate subject of contention. In either case the specifics of the issue are secondary in determining the actor's response[12].

Using these assumptions, we classify boundary disputes into two types: 1) Boundary disputes rooted in prior tensions with an adversary or potential adversary, and 2) Boundary disputes that cause tension with an otherwise amiable ally or potential ally.

In type 1 disputes, China's policy is rather inflexible and Beijing adopts a "hard" position insisting on prior resolution of what it considers general or fundamental issues of "principle" that it perceives to be the root cause of the dispute. Beijing believes that the specific boundary dispute is a symptom of a more fundamental conflict. China's approach to disputes with India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are examples of this approach to disputes.

In type 2 disputes, China takes two different approaches. Beijing adopts a "soft" negotiating position and has shown great flexibility to reach a settlement in an attempt to avert the deterioration of otherwise amicable relations. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, Burma and Nepal are examples of this approach. If relations are otherwise amicable, but the boundary dispute is an impediment to improved relations and too intractable and difficult to resolve in the short term, China will "tactically" shelve the dispute to eliminate it as an immediate impediment to rapprochement, enabling overall relations to improve in an attempt to maintain a favorable balance of power. The case of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan and the South China Seas disputes are examples of this approach.

China's foreign policy is a function of two basic factors: the dynamics of the international system and domestic politics, including decisionmakers' idiosyncratic roles in the foreign policy process. As for the second determinant, domestic politics, although understanding the political process of Beijing's foreign policy formulation is difficult, domestic political restraints clearly play a role[13]. Flexibility in foreign policy is limited by domestic politics, but also by international structural constraints and leaders' perceptions of these constraints. Therefore, we must take account, to the extent possible, of the linkage between the domestic political scene and the international environment. A well-developed hypothesis on China's boundary settlements requires this, but the exact mix of international and domestic factors remains somewhat a mystery[14].

The effect of China's perception of the balance of power on its policy toward specific boundary disputes is the focal point of this hypothesis. This will not only aid in a better explanation of the PRC's handling of boundary disputes, but also illuminate how China's perception of, and relations with, the other parties to a dispute in turn influences the way that China handles these disputes, and how China uses a settlement to further other foreign policy goals.

China's Global Strategy and Boundary Settlements

National security is a primary objective of a state's foreign policy. Decisionmakers most often view foreign policy in "defensive" terms, especially in times of domestic vulnerability when they have a heightened perception of external threat, and adopt policies in an attempt to reduce this threat. To accomplish this, they adopt policies to reduce tension in bilateral relations and facilitate alliances, or at least diminish tension in a bilateral relationship.

We should generally view boundary disputes as a symptom, not the cause, of exacerbated relations between China and its neighbors. And since an international boundary is a reflection of the overall bilateral relationship, we should study it in this larger context[15]. Viewed from this perspective, the boundary settlements that Beijing concluded in the early 1960s and the 1970s can be seen as an attempt by China to preserve or improve relations with a neighboring state to facilitate an alliance, or reduce the confidence a third state may have in this state as an ally or potential ally against China, thus reducing the threat from the state in question toward China[16].

Other studies of China's foreign policy formulation conclude that initially policy elites devise a general framework for foreign policy or one evolves through high level debate and discussion. They then spell out their perceptions of the world in a "world view," such as the "Three Worlds Theory" in the early 1970s. They then translate this general framework into a foreign policy "line" which "serve[s] as the basis for formulating China's comprehensive strategic doctrine.[17]" This general foreign policy line determines specific policy alternatives or derivatives.

To understand the PRC's approach to boundary disputes, they must first be placed in the context of China's fundamental considerations of the balance of power, national interest and other security concerns. China, just as other states, engages in balancing behavior. Shifts in the balance of power determine the PRC's perception of threats. China has been clear in defining what it believes to be the "primary" and "secondary" threats to its security. Rooted in the "united front" strategy developed by Mao during the Communists' protracted struggle for power, China's foreign policy elites have consistently sought to subordinate what they consider "minor contradictions" to form a united front and thereby offset what they perceive as the primary threat- -the "major contradiction"--to their national security[18]. Whenever national interest dictates, Beijing is prepared to subordinate a secondary goal, such as the promotion of revolutionary nationalist movements in the early 1960s, to facilitate accommodation with a particular country and thus achieve the primary goal: maintaining a favorable balance of power[19].

A fundamental shift in the East Asian regional balance of power took place during the early 1960s. I assume there is a correlation between that shift and the fact that Beijing concluded most of China's boundary settlements during that period. Again in the latter 1970s, at the time of a second major shift, Beijing agreed with Tokyo to delay a final settlement and move forward with the Peace and Friendship Treaty, despite the territorial dispute.

When analyzing China's boundary disputes and settlements, one is struck with the inability to resolve disputes with India and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, on the one hand, while on the other, at the same time China negotiated compromise settlements with its other neighbors, allowing bilateral relations to move forward unhindered. This seeming inconsistency can be explained by the hypothesis that the PRC's approach to a dispute is determined by its perception of the balance of power in the region, threat perception, and corresponding foreign policy that in turn determines China's policy toward the specific dispute and its settlement. I conclude that as the various states' roles in the balance of power shifted, the PRC adjusted its foreign policy accordingly and this adjustment is reflected in China's attitude toward the settlement of a particular boundary dispute. Although I argue that these factors largely determine the PRC's policy toward a specific dispute, whether or not they can reach a settlement is not solely determined by these factors; some disputes are so intractable, or the other party to the dispute may have a different foreign policy agenda, that no progress is possible, despite China's attempts to reach a settlement.

The International Environment and China's Boundary Settlements

A broad perspective of the international system provides a context within which we can understand each boundary dispute and settlement, not as an isolated foreign policy decision, but as a response to changes in the balance of power, leaders' perceptions of these changes, and Beijing's corresponding policy toward a particular boundary dispute.

Clearly, the perception of a heightened foreign threat existed among China's elite in the early 1960s, and nearly two decades later during the late 1970s. Boundary settlements reached in the early 1960s, and the manner in which the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was finessed in 1978, have remarkable similarities in terms of China's perception of the balance of power, corresponding threat assessment, and objectives in resolving the disputes at the time.

The open break with the Soviet Union in 1960, in the midst of the disastrous economic situation caused by the failure of the Great Leap Forward heightened Beijing's sense of crisis. China also felt betrayed by the Soviet Union's growing support for India and threatened by the emerging Soviet-Indian alliance with its anti-China raison d'etre. This general international environment set the stage for China's desire for conciliation with other neighboring states and its flexible approach toward the settlement of boundary disputes with these countries from 1960 to 1963.

The foreign policy objective was to maximize China's security by developing a neutral belt of nations around the periphery of China and eliminate the growing U.S. and Soviet influence in the area, especially among China's immediate neighbors. The Sino-Soviet confrontation over Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in early 1969 set the stage for China's trilateral foreign policy orientation emphasizing economic, political and even strategic ties with the U.S., Japan and Western Europe[20]. This led to the signing of a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978, after shelving their territorial dispute, and normalization of U.S.-China relations on January 1, 1979.

With the transformation that Beijing's perception of the balance of power underwent during the early 1960s and again during the 1970s, and the impact this had upon its threat assessment and corresponding foreign policy in mind, the pattern in China's handling of boundary disputes during the early 1960s and late 1970s is understandable. As China's fear of Soviet-Indian encirclement increased in the early 1960s, Beijing moved to settle boundary disputes to achieve vital strategic objectives. The increasing Soviet threat, along with the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the late 1970s, set the stage for improved relations with Japan. To facilitate this, the PRC was willing to set the Sino-Japanese territorial issues aside and conclude the Peace and Friendship Treaty. The similarity in China's approach to boundary settlements during these two periods lends validity to the hypothesis that China's behavior was not idiosyncratic, but rather follows an empirical pattern for which there is a deductive theoretical explanation. With this in mind, I will now turn to an analysis of the Sino- Vietnamese territorial dispute and settlement.

The Genesis of the Boundary Disputes with Vietnam

For many years the Sino-Vietnamese boundary dispute was masked by China and North Vietnam's close cooperation in the face of a common threat from the United States. China was Vietnam's largest supporter during the war, providing approximately twenty million dollars in military assistance and sending more than eighty thousand PLA engineers to Vietnam to develop and maintain the logistical infrastructure. Although China may have been Vietnam's major benefactor during the war, nevertheless, Hanoi looked to Moscow for political leadership[21]. By the early 1970s, China and Vietnam's strategic imperatives conflicted. The Soviet Union had emerged as China's principal threat and the PRC began to seek rapprochement with the United States and Japan. The invitation for President Nixon to visit China in 1972 while Vietnam was still fighting a war against "American imperialism" increased Sino-Vietnamese tension. By 1971, no PLA engineers, remained in Vietnam and military assistance to Vietnam was discontinued by 1975. As Sino-Vietnamese bilateral relations continued to deteriorate, territorial issues that had been downplayed earlier, began to emerge as a primary source of conflict.

The growing tension in Sino-Vietnamese relations during the late 1970s, following several decades of what appeared to be a close alliance, eventually culminated in a six- week border war in February-March 1979. Many scholars pointed out that this enmity was merely a return to the animosity that had historically existed in Sino-Vietnamese relations[22]. According to these scholars, the brief period of cooperation was only possible because they faced a common threat, and a return to the uneasy relations that had historically characterized the relationship was inevitable.

By the late 1970s, China clearly viewed Sino-Vietnamese boundary problems in the context of growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia[23]. Initially, China quietly attempted to reach a settlement with Vietnam in order to eliminate territorial issues as a source of friction in their bilateral relations. Failing to achieve this objective, China used the many clashes along the border as a pretext to go to war and "punish" Vietnam for cooperating with the Soviet Union, and as a way to "disrupt Soviet strategic calculation" in its attempt to encircle and contain China[24]. It was also an attempt to force Hanoi into negotiations to settle the boundary questions.

Although the territorial disputes have a long history, their reemergence in the mid-1970s was a symptom of the underlying tension rooted in regional competition, alliance politics, and bilateral issues such as the treatment of Chinese in Vietnam[25]. This was made clear during the negotiations following the 1979 border war. Beijing often cited other issues as the cause of the conflict and made it clear that issues that were not even strictly bilateral, such as antihegemony and Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, had to be dealt with before the territorial issues could be settled[26].

Territorial Disputes

The present territorial dispute is rooted in the interpretation of the boundary treaty signed by the Qing court and France in 1887 that delimited the land (1,347 Kilometers) and, according to Hanoi, the sea boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin. This treaty was amended by a supplementary convention in 1895. Some scholars consider this treaty unique because at the time China dealt with France "from a position of some strength." The treaty was not subsequently challenged by China, and Beijing's reservations about the treaty did not become known until after the boundary dispute became public in the 1970s[27].

Vietnam maintains that the treaties established a "complete borderline which has a historical basis in the age-old political life of the two nations, a solid international legal value, and all practical elements for recognition on the terrain." At other times, however, Vietnam stated that the Sino-French conventions "are too old and cumbersome to give guidance in defining the frontier," and contended that France "cut off" several pieces of Vietnamese territory and gave them to China[28].

Although China was amenable to using the Sino-French conventions as the basis for a negotiated settlement, it did not recognize the treaties as equal. Beijing pointed out that although China was not defeated by France in 1885, the "Qing Dynasty Government accepted France's humiliating conditions and signed an unequal treaty." The PRC countered Vietnam's assertion that France ceded Vietnamese territory with the query, "How could the Qing Dynasty Government, corrupt and submissive to foreign powers as it was, 'bring pressure to bear on France' and make the latter 'concede' land?"[29].

The dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin stems from the vagueness of the 1887 treaty. Article two of the treaty states that

The islands which are east of the Paris meridian of 105 43' east (108 3' east of Greenwich), that is to say the north-south line passing through the eastern point of the island Tch'a Kou or Ouan-Chan (Tra-co), which forms the boundary, are also awarded to China. The Gotho and other islands west of this meridian belong to Annam[30].

China maintains that this only refers to the islands and does not delimit the gulf itself, while Vietnam argues that the treaty delimits the entire gulf waters.

In 1957, during a period of closer Sino-Vietnamese cooperation, Hanoi proposed that the two countries maintain the status quo until a negotiated settlement could be reached in "accordance with the existing legal principles or with new ones defined by the two Governments." In April 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China accepted this proposal. At the time, both Vietnam and China viewed the 1957-58 exchange of letters as in "keeping with historical reality and international law," and constituting "the common basis for dealing with the boundary issues prior to a negotiated settlement of the boundary question."[31]

Boundary Negotiations

Beginning in 1973, Hanoi rejected the Sino-French treaty as the basis for the boundary, arguing that the treaty was "outmoded, too tedious, and not suitable to mark the boundary," but claimed that nevertheless a "historical boundary line" existed. At this time, Hanoi also claimed that the Tonkin Gulf had never been delimited, but a historical boundary existed there also. In 1974, an attempt to negotiate an agreement on the Tonkin Gulf collapsed after three months of negotiations. [mention the Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands] Further boundary negotiations were initiated in 1975 by Beijing in an attempt to prevent relations with Vietnam from further deteriorating. Following a June 1977 meeting between Li Xiannian and Pham Van Dong, Vietnam agreed to enter negotiations[32]. From October 1977 until August 1978, negotiations were held in an attempt to reach a settlement. Although these negotiations were hampered by a dramatic rise in tensions, and though both sides maintained their basic positions, important procedural issues were settled and they agreed to continue with a second round of negotiations. Before a second round of negotiations could begin, however, Vietnam's treatment of overseas Chinese became the major bilateral issue and the boundary was not discussed again until 1979, following the six-week border war[33].

In the first round of negotiations China put forward a proposal that called for negotiating a new treaty based on "respect for the borderline left by history" and the Sino-French treaties. This new treaty would supersede the earlier ones. Vietnam reverted to its earlier position arguing that the Sino-French treaties established a line that delineated the entire Sino-Vietnamese boundary, including the Tonkin Gulf, and it was only necessary to replace boundary markers that were destroyed or obscured[34]. Agreement was eventually reached to deal with the land boundary first because of the ongoing border incidents and the real possibility of escalating military conflict. The Gulf of Tonkin issue is much more complex and therefore they agreed to deal with this dispute only after the settlement of the land boundary.

Negotiations stalled however. The underlying cause of the impasse was Vietnam's insistence that the Sino-French conventions were legitimate and delimited the land boundary and the Tonkin Gulf, and China's assertion that they were unequal and therefore a new treaty must be negotiated. Vietnam insisted that the entire border was established and was reluctant to negotiate a new treaty for fear that it would allow China to advance historical claims reaching beyond the present boundary. China accepted the earlier treaties, but only as a "problem left over by history" and not binding in the present negotiations. This fundamental disagreement, especially in the context of dramatically deteriorating relations, made mutual accommodation virtually impossible.

Prelude to War

As Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated in the late 1970s, border incidents increased dramatically[35]. As early as 1974, China accused Vietnam of "aggravating . . . tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border" by "inciting" incidents and violating its territory. In the six months before the Chinese invasion in February 1979, Beijing accused Vietnam of encroaching into Chinese territory in 162 locations, provoking 705 armed clashes, and killing or wounding more than 300 people along the border. One of the most serious incidents occurred in August 1978 when, Beijing claimed, Vietnam attempted to force 2,000 Chinese across the border, killing four and attacking PRC officials. Vietnam did not deny the Chinese allegations of incursions, but also accused China of encroaching on Vietnamese territory[36]. China did not deny the Vietnamese allegations and in fact admitted that some incidents occurred when Chinese border officials acted without government authorization.

Tensions in Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to mount as the Soviet- Vietnamese alliance became stronger. Vietnam joined COMECON in June 1978 and China responded by cutting all economic aid and recalling its technical advisors. Hanoi accused Beijing of anti-Vietnam actions and collusion with American imperialism. China began to portray Vietnam as the "Cuba of the East." Increasing friction between the two former allies made further boundary negotiations impossible. In November, Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. At this point, China appears to have concluded that an improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations was unlikely and that closer Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation to encircle China was inevitable[37].

The PRC believed that accommodation with Vietnam was impossible while Vietnam was supported by the USSR. Li Xiannian made this clear when he stated that "the Chinese people are very indignant at this. We have time and again warned the Vietnamese not to turn a deaf ear to what we have said."[38] Under the circumstances a boundary settlement was impossible, and even if China was willing to accept Vietnam's position, it would not have affected the balance of power by decreasing the growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, China's primary security concern. By late 1978, China adopted a new, less conciliatory policy toward Vietnam and began to consider actions to "punish" Vietnam and thwart Soviet strategic objectives[39]. As early as July 1978, China began considering military action to "teach Vietnam a lesson," and a final decision for war was made in late autumn that year, prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. This impending "lesson" was placed in the larger global context also, with Deng Xiaoping arguing that it was "part of China's global anti-hegemonic strategy serving broader interests.[40]"

To prepare for the coming war, the PRC began to improve relations with other states in the region. It retreated from its assertion of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and concluded a peace and friendship treaty with Japan in August, formalizing a Sino-Japanese entente, and then moved quickly to normalize relations with the United States despite continued arms sales to Taiwan[41]. While in the United States in January 1979, Deng Xiaoping clearly indicated Beijing's intentions to "teach Vietnam a lesson." Upon departing the U.S., he stated that "on questions of common interest and the current international situation . . . there is much common ground between us.[42]"

The 1979 Border War

China launched a "counterattack in self-defense" against Vietnam on February 15, 1979. It deployed an estimated 160,000 troops and carried out air strikes in Vietnam. Military installations and industrial facilities in the border area as well as bridges and roads were destroyed[43]. From the outset, the PRC made its limited goals in the border war clear[44]. After penetrating deep into Vietnam, on February 17 China proposed that the two sides "speedily hold negotiations to discuss the restoration of peace and tranquillity along the border and between the two countries and proceed to settle the dispute concerning the boundary and territory.[45]"

Many scholars have argued that the February invasion was a way of retaliating against Vietnam for its invasion of China's ally Cambodia in December 1978[46]. To place too much weight on this hypotheses fails to consider China's perceptions of Soviet-Vietnamese collusion to dominate Southeast Asia and contain China, and the boundary issue itself as a more immediate cause of war. Placing Beijing's decision to go to war within the larger context of the general deterioration of relations and China's grand strategy make a better explanation of China's "counter attack in self-defense" possible. Placing too much emphasis on the Cambodian raison d'etat neglects other considerations such as the timing of the Chinese invasion; as mentioned above, the decision to attack Vietnam was made prior to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia.

At the same time Vietnam was preparing to invade Cambodia, it was provoking China along their border and providing Beijing a pretext for an invasion, a dangerous gambit that is difficult to explain. Months before the February invasion, China had tried to discourage Vietnam from further provocation along their border with clear warnings of possible retaliation. A September 1978 Chinese Foreign Ministry statement warned that Vietnam "must shoulder all responsibility for the consequences arising from the . . . encroachment on Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty.[47]" The day Vietnam began its invasion of Cambodia, Renmin Ribao gave an unequivocal warning that "if it is attacked, it [PRC] will certainly counterattack," and concluded with the assertion that "China means what it says.[48]"

With Vietnam preoccupied in Cambodia, the PRC considered it an opportune time to settle a score along the border and "punish" Vietnam for not settling the boundary dispute earlier[49]. That this was a major purpose of the "lesson" is demonstrated by the fact that when presenting the case for China's planned invasion to the United States in January, Deng cited China's invasion of India in 1962 as a precedent[50]. The Sino-Vietnamese border war also followed the pattern set seventeen years earlier with India: failing to reach a compromise settlement in the boundary dispute, occupy disputed areas by military force, and then call for new negotiations.

Following the invasion, China clearly wanted several preconditions met before the territorial issues could be settled. China believed that agreement on these issues of "principle" would improve Sino-Vietnamese relations and set the stage for a boundary settlement. Beijing was primarily concerned about the growing Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and the direct threat this presented to China. The elimination of this strategic concern, in Beijing's eyes, was a necessary precondition to reaching a boundary settlement[51]. Vietnam insisted that before negotiations could begin, China must withdraw its troops to the "other side of the historical frontier that the two sides have agreed to respect.[52]" Six weeks after the invasion, the PRC withdrew its troops and negotiations began on April 18, 1979 in Hanoi.

Renewed Negotiations

At the first session of this second round of negotiations, Hanoi offered a three-point proposal calling for measures to secure peace along the border, restore normal relations, and settle the boundary based on the historical status quo and the Sino-French conventions of 1887 and 1895. Beijing suggested an eight-point proposal during the following session. China's proposal made it clear Beijing viewed the boundary dispute in a much broader context and wanted Vietnam to concede on several issues of "principle" before actually dealing with the boundary dispute. China wanted to restore relations based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; it also wanted an agreement on "antihegemony" which would forbid stationing troops in a foreign country or joining a military bloc[53]. China agreed that the 1887 and 1895 agreements should be used as the basis for negotiating the land boundary, but insisted that modern principles of international law should be used to demarcate the continental shelf in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Clearly, Vietnam wanted to restrict the negotiations to the land boundary issue and the recent military confrontation. On the other hand, China's earlier attempts through accommodation and conciliation to dissuade Hanoi from developing closer relations with Russia had failed, and unequivocal warnings had not deterred Vietnam's provocations along the border. China was now attempting to use a possible boundary settlement to induce Vietnam to limit Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation and as leverage to induce Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, but also believed that an improvement in overall relations was necessary to set the stage for a boundary settlement[54].

Although Beijing accepted the Sino-French conventions as a basis for boundary negotiations, it would not accept those conventions when delimiting the Gulf of Tonkin where it favored "modern principles" of international law. It was evident that despite appearing to be conciliatory on the land boundary issue, the most important consideration was the two issues of "principle" which required Vietnam to abandon its new position of dominance in Indochina made possible by alliance with the Soviet Union. China's primary concern was growing Soviet influence in a region historically dominated by China. To relieve the tension along the border, Hanoi would first have to curtail its alliance with the Soviet Union and end the occupation of Cambodia. If successful in this gambit, China would achieve an important fundamental foreign policy goalsB curtail Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. This also would set the stage for improved Sino-Vietnamese relations and an eventual boundary settlement, the immediate cause of the border war.

Although a basis for the settlement of the land boundary existed, moving forward was impossible while the political issues remained unresolved. China insisted on first discussing the principle of not seeking hegemony because it believed that this was a fundamental cause of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Vietnam denounced the Chinese proposal as an attempt by China to "evade its responsibility for the war of aggression against Vietnam," and accused China of "raising questions not belonging to bilateral relations between the two countries.[55]" China characterized Vietnam's three-point proposal as ignoring the "major issues of principle leading to the dispute" and therefore demonstrating Vietnam's unwillingness to "improve Sino- Vietnamese relations fundamentally.[56]" China remained unyielding in its demand that "fundamental principles" be discussed before dealing with the border dispute.

After several months of negotiations, the two sides were clearly hopelessly deadlocked. At a June 28, 1979 press briefing, Han Nianlong, the head of China's delegation, rejected Vietnam's proposals as "nothing but an attempt to conceal the tense situation it continues to create along the border." In October Hanoi published a white paper titled "Thrity Year of Sino- Vietnamese Relations." Beijing responded to this document by accusing Hanoi of creating a new anti-China tide. The document was so bitterly anti-China that Beijing believed there was no hope of any progress in negotiations. At the thirteenth plenary session of this second round of boundary negotiations in Beijing on October 19, 1979, Han stated that "negotiations have reached a stalemate and it is difficult to make any progress." He reiterated that since a main cause of poor relations was the issue of regional hegemony, therefore the two sides must begin by discussing the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the principle of not seeking hegemony.[57]" Hanoi continued to press for continued negotiations, but in a March 1980 note accusing Vietnam of being insincere, Beijing rejected further negotiations asserting that Vietnam's unwillingness to first discuss fundamental principles blocked progress toward resolving the root cause of the conflict. China was "willing to wait patiently" and "as soon as an active factor in favor of talks emerges, even if it is a small one," the Chinese would be willing to begin a third round of negotiations. Vietnam responded that the responsibility for suspending the negotiations rested entirely on China[58].

The boundary negotiations broke down for political reasons, not because of disagreements regarding the Sino-French boundary conventions or the 1957-58 exchange of letters. Although China and Vietnam did not completely agree on those issues, a basis for further negotiations existed. China indicated that maintaining the status quo, as had been agreed, did not mean that in future negotiations ownership of disputed territory would be decided according to actual control, but that minor adjustments should be made in a reasonable and fair manner[59]. In earlier boundary settlements with other countries, China had adopted a similar position regarding treaties it considered unequal, but in the end, even ceded territory that was historically China's. The breakdown in negotiations with Vietnam was due not to the technicalities of interpreting previous treaties, but because of more complex political issues complicating Sino-Vietnamese relations. In previous boundary settlements, the PRC had demonstrated that political context and procedural issues are more important than the substantive terms of any particular settlement.

The End Game

Beginning in the late 1980s, as Sino-Soviet relations improved and the stage was set to move forward and eliminate the boundary dispute as a source of friction in what was becoming an otherwise amicable relationship. Renewed Sino-Vietnamese boundary negotiations became possible with China's "preconditions" for the restoration of relations largely satisfied as Vietnam prepared to end its occupation of Cambodia. The atmosphere for mutual accommodation was developing and a breakthrough came during a secret summit meeting held in Chengdu, China in September 1990[60]. Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Du Muoi traveled to Beijing in November 1991 to formalize normal relations between the two countries. Following the summit, they announced an economic agreement and an agreement to work toward a boundary settlement[61]. The groundwork for the renewal of normal relations and the reinitiation of boundary negotiations should be placed in the larger context of China's (and Vietnam's) larger global strategy. After pursuing a policy of aiding Vietnam in it war of resistance against France, and then the U.S., during the 1970s, Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated due to the shift in both countries strategic concerns. As China was pursing a policy of economic reform and opening up to the U.S. and others, initiated in late 1978, Sino-Vietnamese relations were reaching their lowest ebb. Beijing had made efforts, but failed to eliminate the boundary dispute as major cause of Sino-Vietnamese conflict. However, by the late 1980s, China and Vietnam renewed their interest in better relations. Both countries were now interested in promoting economic development and viewed smooth relations along the border as an important factor in improving overall Sino-Vietnamese relations. Both country's policies of openness and economic reform "transformed the priority and policy context" of the boundary issue in the 1980s[62].

Increased economic activity along the border served both Beijing's and Hanoi's larger interests in economic development. The renormalization of relations in November 1991, despite the lack of a boundary settlement, made smoother cross-border economic relations and trade possible. But, in fact, this formal diplomatic move, simply legitimized what was already taking place beginning in late 1988 when many Vietnamese and Chinese crossed the border to trade and carry out other relations[63]. Within the next few years, they repaired roads and reestablished rail links. China designated three towns along the border and two major cities in the region for preferential policies to facilitate trade. Between 1988 and 1992, Guangxi and province Vietnam enjoyed a 600 percent increase in total trade, and between 1993 and 1998, there were a total of 12.77 million border crossings[64]. From Vietnam's perspective also, an open border economically benefits the more isolated regions of northern Vietnam that border China[65]. While improvement in overall relations and in particular economic relations improved, the unsettled boundary presented an impediment to the smooth development in these relations.

A logical extension of these improved relations, was the decision to renew boundary negotiations following the full normalization of relations in November 1991 during the visit to Beijing of Party Secretary-General Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet In the communique on normalization, Beijing and Hanoi agreed to settle their territorial disputes peacefully and establish a border of "peace and friendship" and restore "traditional friendly relations." The communique made it clear that attention would first focus on the land boundary, then the Tonkin Gulf. Beijing's renewed interest in settling the boundary and the more conciliatory approach reflects China's view that the Sino-Vietnamese boundary dispute was now a cause of friction in an otherwise amicable relationship, rather than the symptom of more fundamental underling conflicts.

In February 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen traveled to Hanoi, and they agreed to establish working group on the land boundary dispute. They renewed negotiations in October 1992, and although they reported "positive results," there was little indication that they made any substantive progress. The focus of the dispute remained the Sino-French treaty, both its legitimacy and interpretation. In February 1993, they held a second round, but a settlement remained elusive. Following visits in May by China's minister of defense, and in October by Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, on October 13 they agreed on "basic principle" for delimiting the land boundary and "dividing" the Gulf of Tonkin. They established an expert-level working group to deal with the Gulf of Tonkin also.

During a Beijing meeting between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh in November 1993, both leaders simply reiterated "historical claims" to the disputed territory. Nevertheless, they reached an "oral agreement" to shelve the South China Sea dispute for the time being and focus on the land boundary and Tonkin Gulf disputes. During a second visit by Jiang to Vietnam in November 1994, a communique announced the continuation of negotiations on the land boundary and the Gulf of Tonkin[66].

As relations continued to warm, tension along the boundary abated and by early 1995, they had reopened twenty-one road links and Vietnam had cleared thousands of mines along the border, allowing nearly ten thousand families to return to the area. They rebuilt and opened the rail link between Long Son and Pingxiang in June 1997, and reopened a second rail link between Kunming and Hanoi in April 1997, closing an important chapter of hostilities and difficult negotiations. However, placing these improvements on border relations and negotiations in a larger context is important. While negotiations to settle the land boundary and Tonkin Gulf were making some progress, Sino-Vietnamese relations in the South China Sea were tense, initiated by a military conflict in 1988, during which Beijing attacked Vietnamese held islands, defeating Vietnamese forces and for the first time since 1949, establishing a foothold in these disputed waters[67]. The intensification of the South China Sea dispute placed a shadow over Sino- Vietnamese relations, but given the new strategic context of negotiations to settle the land boundary and Tonkin Gulf dispute, China called for both sides to adopt the attitude that the more complicated South China Seas disputes should not "impair friendly relations" or negatively affect the "good atmosphere and good conditions for ongoing bilateral talks on the territorial issue." During government-level talks in mid-August in Hanoi between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Vu Koan, they agreed that the South China Sea territorial disputes should not affect the "normal" development of bilateral relations[68].

Negotiations went forward with a third meeting of the working group-level meetings in late October followed by a visit by Jiang Zemin in November. While they made progress on the land boundary, the Chinese protested Vietnam's decision to allow foreign companies to explore for offshore oil in the Gulf of Tonkin, but this did not delay the progress in negotiations[69]. During 1995, working group-level meetings continued and in July during government-level meetings in Beijing, negotiators expressed the desire to "speed up the negotiation process." During working-level meetings in October, they agreed on a "number of technical measures leading to the signing of a border agreement." The December meeting between Jiang Zemin and Do Muoi affirmed the agreement to settle the boundary according to principles of international law and practice. They also decided that in order to sign a treaty "as soon as possible," they would settle the remaining differences along the border "quickly" "on the spot.[70]"

The final settlement of the land boundary was clearly in sight, but Sino-Vietnamese relations in the South China Sea continued to simmer, especially over issues such as contracting with foreign firms to explore for oil in disputed waters. However, China did not want this to infect the final stage in concluding a boundary treaty. Working group-level meeting continued and they held government-level visits despite the friction on other territorial issues. In March 1997, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that China "cherishes its friendship" with Vietnam and is "ready to hold friendly consultations" to "properly solve certain problems" left over by history[71]. This was clearly a reference to the South China Sea dispute and an effort to insulate this conflict from the progress on the land boundary settlement. Progress continued through 1997 and 1998.

Since renormalization in 1991, an annual summit of top leaders has become routine. During these meetings they discussed boundary issues in order overcome major political obstacles and maintain momentum at the working group-level. During one of these meetings in March 1999, China and Vietnam announced the decision to sign a formal agreement on the land boundary by the end of the year and anticipated an agreement demarcating the Gulf of Tonkin by the end of 2000. They agreed on the final details of the boundary treaty during Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit to Hanoi in early December and the treaty was officially concluded on December 30. The National People's Congress ratified the treaty in April 2000 and work on demarcating the boundary is underway[72].

Conclusions

The Vietnam case highlights the distinct pattern of behavior Beijing adopted in earlier boundary disputes and settlements during the 1960s and later in the 1970s with Japan. As the global strategic context of Sino-Vietnamese relations changed from one of fundamental conflict to one of cooperation, China adopted the attitude that the dispute should not remain "unresolved forever or halt the development of bilateral relations until a settlement is reached." Rather, "the two countries should take the common interests of both countries into consideration, look beyond certain disputes and promote the development of bilateral relations.[73]"

The systemic factors that determined Beijing's policy in the 1960s and 1970s have changed dramatically. The effect of this is shown in the settlement with Russia in the early 1990s, and with Vietnam more recently. As more fundamental strategic causes of conflict abated, China adopted a policy of not allowing the boundary disputes to infect what were otherwise amicable relations. Previously, Beijing had insisted that fundamental issues of "principle" had to be resolved before they would negotiate specific boundary and territorial issues.

What are the implications of this for China's attitude and policy toward the yet unsettled disputes in the South China Sea, with Japan, India, and Tajikistan? If Beijing no longer perceives an acute threat to China's security will Beijing seek to settle these remaining disputes in efforts to smooth relations with its economically important Southeast Asian neighbors, regional power and potential competitor India, and with Tajikistan to facilitate closer cooperation in dealing with the Islamic independence movements in China's western region? The South China Sea disputes are complicated by their multilateral nature. Nevertheless, while China has rejected bilateral negotiations, Beijing has not ruled out multilateral cooperation. Recent improvement in Sino-India relations, even in the wake of India's nuclear tests, show that China will not allow the boundary dispute to interfere with progress on other issues. However, India's rather inflexible attitude on the boundary makes progress in the near future unlikely. While relations with Japan are fairly smooth, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute remains a flash point for nationalistic sentiments on both sides and in the near term, no progress toward a settlement is likely. China's relations with the newly independent Central Asian states are generally very good, even if there is some apprehension over China's ambitions for regional influence. The primary impediment to a China-Tajikistan settlement of their Pamir boundary is Tajikistan's internal instability. No fundamental conflict of interest should prevent an eventual settlement.

As with earlier cases, and more recently with the Sino-Vietnamese settlement of their land boundary, a characteristic of the PRC's boundary settlements is that the possibility of some compensating gain seems to motivate China to seek a compromise settlement, even if this does require Beijing to relinquish territory it views as historically China's[74]. This pattern will likely characterize any future settlements as well.

[1] J.R.V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), 451.

[2] Brantly Womack, "International Relationships and the Border of China and Vietnam," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000):982.

[3] Examples are Whiting, Ross, Christensen.

[4] Debra Satz and John Ferejohn, "Rational Choice and Social Theory" (1993 manuscript), 7 quoted in Donald P. Greeen and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 22

[5] Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, 27.

[6] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley, 1979), 27 (or maybe 65).

[7] See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[8] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 68, 90. See Michael Ng-Quinn, "The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 2 (June 1983):203-04 for discussion of the international environmental constraints on foreign policy.

[9] Sven Tagil, Studying Boundary Conflicts, 131-33.

[10] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 65.

[11] See, Michael Ng-Quinn, "Effects of Bipolarity on Chinese Foreign Policy," Survey: a Journal of East and West Studies 26, no. 2 (1982):102-30.

[12] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 44-45.

[13] See, Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), Chs. 1 & 7 and Kenneth Lieberthal, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," in Harry Harding, ed. China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 43-70 for a good discussion of domestic sources of foreign policy.

[14] June Teufel Dreyer, "Introduction," in Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy ed. June Teufel Dreyer (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 8.

[15] J.R.V. Prescott, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1965), 19-20.

[16] Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984):471.

[17] Hua Di, "China's Comprehensive Strategic Doctrine," The Role of Technology in Meeting the Defense Challenges of the 1980s (A special report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, Stanford University, 1981), 67.

[18] See, Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review 59, no. 1 (March 1965):80-99; Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

[19] V.P. Dutt, China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1964), 100.

[20] See Samuel S. Kim, "Whither Post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?" International Organization 35, no. 3 (Summer 1981):433-65.

[21] See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam War, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995).

[22] See Bruce Burton, "Contending Explanations of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War," International Journal 34, no. 4 (Autumn 1979):699-722.

[23] See FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (September 14, 1978):A12-14; (November 13, 1978):A8-9.

[24] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977- 81 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 409.

[25] See Han Nianlong, ed., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 330-31.

[26] United Nations Document (S/14047).

[27] See, J.R.V. Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975), 448, 451; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A diplomatic history of China: the period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979] (Henan: Renmin chubanshe, 1988), 516-21.

[28] United Nations Document (S/13234), (S/13318); Beijing Review 20, no. 21 (May 25, 1979):20; Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," 148; Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan, 1997), 349.

[29] Beijing Review 22, no. 21 (May 25, 1979):19-20.

[30] Prescott, Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty, 453; Han Nianlong, ed., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 335; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [Diplomatic History of China], 519.

[31] Han Nianlong, ed., Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 337; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [A Diplomatic History of China], 516; Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 4 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shiqi, 1979-1994 [A Diplomatic History of China: Period of the PRC, 1979-1994], 132-33; United Nations Document (S/13234), (S/13318).

[32] Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [A Diplomatic History of China], 517; Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy], 163.

[33] See Nayan Chanda, "Anatomy of the Conflict," Far Eastern Economic Review 99, no. 2 (January 13, 1978):11-12; Richard Nations, "'Comrades' War of Words and Honor," FEER 99, no. 4 (January 27, 1978); Chanda, "Peking Escalates the War of Nerves," FEER 99, no. 11 (March 17, 1978):10; Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute."

[34] Beijing Review 22, no. 21 (May 25, 1979):16-18.

[35] Xie Yixian, ed. Zhongguo dangdai waijiao shi [History of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997), 338.

[36] Beijing Review 22, no. 21 (May 25, 1979):21; On Vietnam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1978), 71-72, 103-06; United Nations Document (S/13255), (S/13093), (S/13094); Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Boundaries of Indochina: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam," Boundary and Territory Briefing 2, no. 6 (International Boundaries Research Unit, 1998):34-37; Xie Yixian, ed. Zhongguo dangdai waijiao shi [History of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy], 340.

[37] Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [A Diplomatic History of China], 503-05, 523- 25; Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy], 345-46.

[38] FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (February 12, 1979):A7; see also Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy], 357.

[39] See FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (September 6, 1978):A4; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 409; on Chinese concerns about Soviet influence see Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy], 357.

[40] Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986), 261.

[41] See Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao (New York: Praeger, 1986), Ch. 5.

[42] FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (February 6, 1979):A2; see also Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 408-12.

[43] United Nations Document (S/13093).

[44] See FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (February 21, 1979):A4; (February 23, 1979):A11.

[45] United Nations Document (S/13094), (S/13129).

[46] See Ross, Indochina Tangle, 223-37; Burton, "Contending Explanations of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War."

[47] FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (September 18, 1978):A13; see also (October 26, 1978):A19; (November 13, 1978):A8-9.

[48] FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (December 26, 1978):A13-16.

[49] This interpretation was suggested by Chinese scholars during interviews at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, July 1994.

[50] Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 409.

[51] For a discussion of Beijing's threat perception, see Yang Gongsu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiao lilun yu shijian [Theory and Practice of PRC Diplomacy], 357-58.

[52] United Nations Document (S/13134).

[53] Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [A Diplomatic History of China], 522.

[54] See FBIS, Daily Report: PRC (September 14, 1978):A12-14; (November 13, 1978):A8-9; (January 9, 1979):A21-22.

[55] United Nations Document (S/13434).

[56] Beijing Review 22, no. 18 (May 4, 1979):28.

[57] Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi Vol. 3 [A Diplomatic History of China], 523-24; United Nations Document (S/13583).

[58] United Nations Document (S/14047), (S/14054).

[59] United Nations Document (S/13255); Beijing Review 22, no. 21 (May 25, 1979):16-17.

[60] Gu Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, "Border Cooperation Between China and Vietnam in the 1980s," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000):1044.

[61] Tian Zengpei, ed., Gaige kaifang yilai de Zhongguo waijiao [China's Foreign Relations since Reform and Opening] ( Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1993), 81-82; NYT (November 4, 1991), A4.

[62] Gu Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, "Border Cooperation Between China and Vietnam in the 1980s," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000): 1045.

[63] Gu Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, "Border Cooperation Between China and Vietnam in the 1980s," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000): 1042.

[64] Gu Xiaosong and Brantly Womack, "Border Cooperation Between China and Vietnam in the 1980s," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000): 1048, 1050.

[65] See Christopher T. Roper, "Sino-Vietnamese Relations and the Economy of Vietnam's Border Region," Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2000): 1020.

[66] United Press International (August 28, 1993), Kyodo News Service (November 19, 1993); China News Digest (December 23, 1993), (November 22, 1994).

[67] For a detailed analysis see, Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Dispute: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements," Pacific Affairs 68, no. 1 (Spring 1995):34-54; Eric Hyer, "Dangerous Shoals: An Introduction to the South China Sea Disputes," The American Asian Review 12, no. 4 (Winter 1994):7-22.

[68] British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East 2040 (July 6, 1994), G/5; 2078 (Aug. 19, 1994), B/6.

[69] British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East 2128 (October 14, 1994), G/2; 2158 (October 31, 1994), B/6; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, East Asia (October 20, 1994), 84.

[70] British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East 2356 (July 15, 1995), G/6-7; 2441 (October 23, 1995); 2479 (December 6, 1995), B/3-4.

[71] British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East 2880 (March 31, 1997), G/15.

[72] The text of the treaty has yet to be made public.

[73] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson quoting Jiang Zemin. China Daily, (May 30, 2000), 1.

[74] Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China (New York: Praeger, 1966), 92. 5

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