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Vietnam Journal

A complete guide about Vietnam since 2001

The Zhuang In The Sino-Vietnamese Frontier during the Qing-Era

By Jeffrey Barlow, Ph. D

History, University of California, Berkeley / Matsushita Chair of Asian Studies at Pacific University

First published in Vietnam Journal, October 2002 issue

An image appeared here in the original.

The extreme violence of the Taiping years was to prove but prologue to the remainder of the 19th century in Guangxi. While the Taiping were destroyed in the north and local rebels pacified in the south, the government failed to truly stabilize the region. The violence simmered at a level comparable to that prior to the 1840s. The regional political and economic context grew even more complicated with the constantly increasing French presence in Vietnam.

THE FRENCH IN VIETNAM

The French arrival in Vietnam was in large part a consequence of their long rivalry with England. In the seventeenth century the French East India Company had attempted to open trade with Vietnam,[1] but the British victory in India cut this effort short. Then in the late eighteenth century the struggle between the Nguyen, the Trinh, and the Tayson presented France with another opportunity. Nguyen Anh enlisted French aid which proved important, if not decisive, and ascended the Vietnamese throne as the Gia-long Emperor (r. 1802-1820). The three emperors who succeeded him, Minh-mang (r. 1820-41), Thieu-tri (r. 1841-48), and Tu-duc (r. 1848-83) were far less open to foreign influence and Vietnam became constantly more hostile to the French, particularly to French missionaries. After the advent of the Second Empire in 1852, France increasingly emulated other European colonial powers and resorted to force to establish direct control in Vietnam.

Any hopes which the Nguyen might have had of warding off the French were frustrated when they had simultaneously to face internal enemies in Tonkin. This problem, like that of the 1830's, involved a number of hostile forces, now including Vietnamese Catholic converts and, again, Nong clans and a Le restorationist movement, all of whom opposed the court at Hue. Tu-duc, in order to deal with Tonkin, settled with the French, signing the Treaty of Saigon in June, 1862.[2] This treaty ceded three southern provinces, granted freedom of action to French missionaries, and extracted an indemnity of four million dollars, as well as stipulating that France be consulted before any subsequent agreements were signed with other European powers. By 1867, France controlled an additional three provinces.[3] French expansion now meant that the Chinese faced a new threat, French ambitions directed at their own south.

LATE QING-ERA ADMINISTRATION IN THE FRONTIER REGION

The Taiping defeat created a new situation for the Qing in the south. The court had made some important administrative changes in the frontier region in order to confront the challenge of ubiquitous violence which preceded the Taiping movement. The "Green Standard" forces of Han troops had proved inadequate. Their failure had been due both to Qing decline, and to the factors which had always diminished the value of northern troops in the south: illness and an inability to compete with local forces in the forbidding terrain. The headquarters of the Green Standard forces in Guangxi had been in Nanning prefecture. The tuanlian forces expanded to fill the lacunae created by the inability of the Green Standard forces to maintain local order. In the late Taiping period the tuanlian were formalized as the Yong-ying (Braves), following the model established by Zeng Guofan's Hunanese forces.[4] The distinction between the yong and the tuanlian organizations was perhaps clear in the mind of Zeng, but it became blurred in local practice.[5] As the Taiping rebellion came to a close, those tuanlian units which were not disbanded were taken onto government rolls and continued to operate as "yong." The yong units were largely active in the far south on the Vietnamese border because the local unrest continued there much longer. Regular forces were adequate to police the north of the province.

The Yong, then, were largely Zhuang, like the bandits whom they opposed. The yong, although their origins lay in the tuanlian, were somewhat different from them. The tuanlian had been, in theory at least, under close control of the gentry as an element of the Bao-jia collective security organization. The yong, however, were not necessarily recruited in a given area and led by the local elite; they were frequently brought into a troubled area from outside for limited campaigns. While the yong began in some areas as an extension of the regular and tuanlian forces, they usually became quite independent.[6] There were no fixed rules nor regulations for the recruitment or control of yong. In practice, they became little more than mercenary groups. Many yong units began as bandits, and then were persuaded to support the government.

The long and porous Vietnamese border was an increasing problem for the Qing. The Nguyen government was unable to consolidate control. The Emperor Tu-duc all but ceded the region to local bandits, both Vietnamese and, increasingly, Chinese.[7] The border was ill-defined; the Manchu court was not even agreed on its length. It was variously stated between 1886 and 1890 to run from 1700 to 2,000 li.[8] By the late Qing era the formal administrative apparatus in the region of Ningming district alone consisted of 36 ai (small passes) through which men and mule caravans could easily cross, one formal guan (large pass) at Zhen Nan, and 15 chai (customs posts). The strength of the garrisons at these posts fluctuated during the Qing years as local conditions demanded and Qing resources permitted.[9]

The long-term movements of Zhuang peoples into the frontier region increased the region's utility as a refuge for defeated rebels fleeing Guangxi. Yan Ling Guo, the last attempt at an independent local Zhuang regime, had been destroyed in 1862 and Wu Lingyun killed. Huang Dingfeng had been killed in 1865; Da Cheng Guo had collapsed in 1866. In the fall of 1867, the Qing General Feng Zicai (1818-1903) established his headquarters at Nanning.[10] Feng was a former outlaw from the Bobai region of southeast Guangxi who had joined the Imperial Army and rose to become a major commander in the Jiangnan campaigns. Feng relied heavily upon Tianzhou tusi troops (then administered from Baise which had become the administrative center of the region) and began to drive the surviving bandits into the frontier zone.[11] 1867 then serves as a convenient end-point for the local turmoil in Guangxi in that, following this date, rebels were not again strong enough to seize and hold fortified positions from which to attempt to expand their control; they had become mere bandits. But this government victory was a limited one for many rebels were still in the field.

Feng Zicai was briefly distracted by the need to suppress a Miao rising in Guizhou. In his absence bandits came out of their nests in the Zuo river region and again extended their power. Among them was Wu Hezhong (also known as Wu Yazhong), the son of Wu Lingyun of Yan Ling Guo. Feng sent a brigade back to the region and himself returned to once again coordinate pacification. The Qing regulars were augmented with several ten thousands of yong. Wu Hezhong was driven deeper into the border region. There he attracted great numbers of rebels who had earlier fled into Vietnam and his power grew. Feng established a local base at Longzhou.[12] In the late spring of 1868, Wu crossed the border into Vietnam and occupied the region around Cao Bang, building strong defenses mounting cannon. He then raided back into Taiping prefecture where he recruited additional followers, and defeated attempts by Feng to defeat him.

A local factor contributing to Huang's strength was the presence of many unemployed Zhuang soldiers who had served on either side in the rebellions, and large groups of laborers who had worked in the cross-border trade into Vietnam, now unemployed from the economic dislocations of the war.[13] A local Vietnamese administrator attempted to control the bandit gangs by giving them formal appointments as local administrators.[14] In addition to Wu Hezhong, several other major gangs were operating in the frontier between Cao Bang and Lang Son. This situation now threatened both Chinese and Vietnamese control over their respective border regions. The Vietnamese court made a formal request for assistance. Feng Zicai sent 12,000 men to Longzhou and in the fall of 1869 led a large expedition of Guangxi yong tightly controlled by his own professional staff. The fighting was savage, on the scale of the brutality of the Taiping years. It took Feng's force nine successive and very costly attacks to reduce Wu's defense works, but the outcome was inevitable. In the 9th month, Wu, his mother, wife, son, and uncle all died in battle or were executed.[15] Feng then mopped up a number of other gangs and was richly rewarded by Tu-duc before exiting to China in the summer of 1870.[16]

The victory over Wu Hezhong was of great symbolic importance. Wu was the last surviving leader of the important Zhuang groups of the Taiping years. Other major leaders in the frontier now "returned to virtue" and enlisted with the Qing. Among them were Huang Zongying and Liu Yongfu, both of whom had served under Wu Lingyun. Liu Yongfu was to prove to be one of the enduring strongmen of the Sinovietnamese frontier. He was a Hakka, his family originally from the southeast region at Bobai county in Wuzhou prefecture near the Vietnamese border. The family moved steadily west in succeeding generations and resided in Shangen at Liu's birth, about 1837.[17] Liu's family was incredibly poor, even for the poverty-stricken border region. His family died, one by one, while he was a child. At the age of sixteen Liu buried his uncle, the last adult survivor, wrapping the corpse in a straw mattress because even the wood of the door had earlier been used to encoffin first his father, then his mother. Liu and his brother tended cattle for a local landlord, for which they were paid in unhulled rice. At some point in his youth he also worked as a boatman, probably in the cross-border trade with Vietnam.[18] One night a force of several hundred local bandits trudged through the village and Liu joined them.

His hard life and his familiarity with the border region well prepared Liu for a life as a bandit. He spoke Zhuang as well as Hakka,[19] and can be regarded, like Shi Dakai and Wei Changhui, as a man on the margins of both cultures who moved easily in either. He served with Yan Ling Guo, meeting Wu Hezhong in the process, and is mentioned as raiding across the Vietnamese border in cooperation with the Tongyi and Xunyi Dang secret societies as early as 1853.[20]

Huang Zongying was originally from Zhen'an prefecture in the far southwest of Guangxi.[21] Although he was probably a Zhuang, it is possible that his ethnicity was mixed; he moved easily among Zhuang, Hmong (Miao). and Vietnamese. Some court sources refer to him as a "Vietnamese rebel."[22] Although usually known as Huang Zongying, he spent sufficient time with the Hmong (Miao) in Vietnam to adopt the common Hmong clan name Pan, calling himself Pan Lunsi.[23] Huang was a secret society leader, and like Liu Yongfu, served with Wu Lingyun and followed Wu Hezhong into the border region. The contingent of several hundred men which he led were known as the Huang Qi (The Yellow Flags).[24] Liu Yongfu styled his unit the Hei Qi (The Black Flags ).

The prestige of Wu Hezhong had briefly held together in common cause leaders like Liu and Huang who served with him. Wu's activities had a political content as he was the heir to his father's movement. With his demise, however, the various units were reduced to a mere struggle for survival. Huang was initially the stronger of the two men and raided into Yunnan from Lao-kay (Lai Chau) in Vietnam which he controlled. The Qing court believed that he had some tie with foreigners (presumably the French) and received modern weapons from them.[25] For his part, Liu may early have had an understanding with the Vietnamese court, who perhaps tolerated his presence both because they could do little about it, and because they saw him as preferable to Huang Zongying.[26] The accounts of the events are contradictory, but the two fell out over control over Baosheng in Vietnam. Huang attempted to assassinate Liu, and the two clashed. Liu's more disciplined troops were capable of volley fire; they drove out Huang's larger force. Huang's death, like his origins, are unclear; he was said in varying sources to have been killed by either the Qing or the French.[27]

Following the defeat of Huang Zongyin, Liu Yongfu became the most powerful figure in the frontier. Liu's Black Flags were divided into three units in the Qing style, the Front, Left, and Right Brigades. The "Tiger General" of the Front Brigade was Huang Shouzhong, like Liu, to be an enduring figure in the region. Huang was a Zhuang, as were most of his men.[28] Wu Fengdian, the Tiger General of the Left Brigade was also a Zhuang, as, we presume, were his men. The ethnicity of Yang Zhu'en, the Tiger General of the Right Brigade, is unknown, but the twenty most important unit leaders of the Black Flags are all said to have been Zhuang.[29]

After the defeat of Wu, Liu Yongfu in effect surrendered to the Qing, but, through agreements which are unclear, was left in place in the border region. He probably swore to cease outright banditry in favor of a lower profile as a semi-licit regional strongman. This agreement, which had the approval of the Vietnamese, was a pragmatic recognition that the area could be closely controlled from neither Beijing nor Hanoi, and therefore an arrangement on the order of the tusi system was the best alternative available to either power.

Liu and his men did much to develop the region around Bao Sheng on the border. Originally little more than a village with bamboo houses and narrow alleys, Bao Sheng became a town with many streets and some three hundred brick buildings with tile roofs, all built by Liu's men. There was a temple to Ye Po, and across the stream from it, a matching one to Ye Gong, unknown male and female deities. The symbolism of the temples was intended to show that China and Vietnam were the maternal and paternal countries of the community. Liu himself built and supported another temple, consecrated to the spirits of three men who had died saving his life in battle. Before Liu's occupation there had been almost no local population, but Liu offered wild lands to whomever wished to take refuge there from the turmoil of the frontier and did not charge taxes for the first several years in which new lands were worked. The result was that much land was opened and light paid to Liu at the harvest. The Black Flags raised rice, cassava, taro, sugar cane, and peanuts, though additional grain had to be brought up from Hanoi.[30]

Liu held official position from the Vietnamese court, who initially depended upon him to control the Hmong (Miao) around Cao Bang. In 1867 he was awarded the rank of Battalion Commander of the Seventh Grade, and continually promoted thereafter, by both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments.[31]

An issue in the frontier conflicts of these years was the control of the cross-border trade. The trade had been damaged by the secret society risings and the Taiping wars but it was always of significant local value, particularly in light of the great poverty of the border region. Whomever controlled the major transit points could tax the trade and had sufficient leverage with the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and increasingly, with the French, to be reluctantly tolerated if willing to permit the trade to continue. The trade again expanded as the border was pacified, and as Liu developed the region about Bao Sheng. The trade increased to the point where a substantial community of Cantonese merchants grew up. These people constructed a temple to Guandi with materials shipped in from Guangdong.[32]

The unquantifiable factor in this trade is opium. By 1862 the opium trade had begun to be substantial. One stimulus was the market in Vietnam. Following the treaty of 1862, the Nguyen court had to pay to France an indemnity of 2,800,000 silver taels. Among other measures, the court offered monopoly rights to sell opium in the northern provinces to Chinese merchants for an annual payment of 302,200 Qian, the equivalent of 300-500 taels of silver.[33] This was probably the factor which drew the Guangdong merchant community to Bao Sheng, a convenient point for Liu to market wholesale opium. Prior to this time the sale of opium had been a capital crime. Once opium was permitted, licensed, and taxed, smuggling then became very attractive. It was very valuable per unit of weight and came to serve as a currency in the frontier, like gold, silver, and foreign and Chinese coins.

We know that there were established opium dens in Nanning and Longzhou by about 1868, for Lu Rongting, the future Guangxi warlord, worked in dens in those two places as a youth.[34] By 1870 opium was probably the major part of the cross-border trade. By 1899 the market for opium was sufficiently large that the French, in order to pay for the costs of administering Vietnam, instituted a formal monopoly which raised the price very high; this further encouraged smuggling from Guizhou and Yunnan via Guangxi. The increasing importance of opium as a commercial crop in Yunnan soon made Guangxi very important as the transit route to Canton and to Vietnam's Red River Delta. Liu Yongfu's dominance in the region made him the virtual arbiter of the trade.

As of 1871, although Wu Hezhong and other major leaders had either been killed or had enlisted in the Qing service, troubles in Guangxi continued. There were also risings on the Vietnamese side, said to be those of purely Vietnamese bandits, and Qing authorities grew concerned that the trouble would spill over, so border defenses were strengthened and troops increased in Taiping prefecture. Problems in Haiphong and Taiyuan in northeast Vietnam did affect Guangdong. In 1872, joint Sino-Vietnamese operations were conducted against bandits along the border.[35] In 1873, the Vietnamese again requested Chinese assistance.[36] In 1875, the You river Zhuang toumu, Zhao Wu, was dispatched into Vietnam to deal with the local bandits, including Huang Zongying, and with the local Hmong (Miao). Zhao dealt with local Nong leaders and through them gained access to the Miao, whom he then persuaded to turn upon the Chinese gangs operating in the area.[37]

The events of the 1860's and 1870's had the effect of increasing Chinese interests in the border region, and diminishing Vietnamese sovereignty there. From the Chinese perspective, this was no more than a confirmation of the proper functioning of the Tribute System through which China conducted foreign affairs, particularly in adjoining buffer regions like the Sino-Vietnamese frontier. For the French, however, Chinese activities in the border zone presented a distinct threat. For the Vietnamese, they presented an opportunity to play off the traditional menace, China, against the new threat, France.

The French had originally been drawn to Indochina not for its own value, but because they viewed it as the back door to China. Yunnan initially seemed to them to be the most promising province of south China and they undertook a number of exploratory missions, both publicly and privately financed. The 1866-68 Lagree-Garnier expedition was the most important of these; it demonstrated that the Mekong, which the expedition followed through Cambodia and Laos into Yunnan, was not, contrary to French expectations, a useful route into Yunnan. Garnier, who led the expedition after Lagree's death, now argued that the Red River provided better prospects for the commercial penetration of the region.[38] This belief made Vietnam the necessary staging area for expansion into China.

The French, seeking any possible pretext to expand their position in Vietnam, found one in events occurring at Hanoi in 1873. A French adventurer-merchant, Jean Dupuis, had become involved in a trading venture between Tonkin, the French term for the northern third of Vietnam, and Yunnan. His initial venture, a barter agreement involving Vietnamese goods and French arms to be secured at Hanoi and sent to Yunnan for Chinese tin and copper, fell afoul of Vietnamese monopolies on salt. Depuis, when refused the salt in Hanoi, took part of the citadel there by force and called for French support from Saigon. The Vietnamese government, clinging to a shadow of independence at the court in Hue, asked that the trade be stopped and Depuis evicted. Admiral Dupre, the French Governor of Cochin China in the south, sent Garnier to Hanoi with about 200 men to arbitrate. Garnier rather joined forces with Dupuis, siezed the remainder of the citadel, and sent for reinforcements. From there he expanded his control into adjoining areas. Local officials in Hanoi, dispairing of assistance from Hue, called upon Liu Yongfu and the Black Flags. Garnier was killed in a sortie against them at Hanoi on December 21, 1873.[39]

While the French felt obliged to repudiate Garnier and Dupuis and evacuate Tonkin, they took the opportunity to squeeze additional advantages from the Vietnamese court. The agreements of March, 1874, gave the French formal rights over Cochin China, opened a number of additional ports, and accorded them navigation rights on the Red River to Yunnan as well. The Emperor Tu-duc, however, simultaneously strengthened his country's status as a Tribute State, hoping to move the Chinese to support him against the French. [40]

The French, however, had specifically intended the treaty of 1874 to supplant all Chinese claims over Vietnam based upon the Tribute System.[41] The Chinese, totally unaware of the contradiction between the Western system of international relations premised upon the equality of contracting parties and their own Tribute System which was based on a cultural relationship which could not be altered by a mere document, did not protest. In 1875, a French diplomat informed the Chinese government that Vietnam was independent of all Chinese authority and that henceforth China should cease dispatching troops across the border in pursuit of bandits. The diplomat also requested permission to use the Red River to begin trading with Yunnan. Prince Kong of the Zongli Yamen replied that the French request was out of the question and that, as Vietnam was a Tributary state, China, and not France, held it as a protectorate and was obliged to defend it against bandits. The French and Chinese views were shown to be completely incompatible.

As a consequence of the incidents of 1874, the Chinese court became alarmed at the threat to south China and began a long policy debate. The consequences of the evaluation was a decision to move to a posture of more active resistance to French encroachment. The framework for the discussion and the resultant decision was the duties and obligations of the Chinese toward Vietnam as a Tribute state. The Chinese now appreciated the double threat posed by the French: to fail to come to Vietnam's aid would undermine the ethos of the Tribute System, affecting even the Emperor's claim to his throne, and more practically, China's borders were immediately threatened.[42]

The tense situation in the border was further inflamed by another major Chinese incursion into Vietnam, led by Li Yangcai. Li was a career Chinese military officer from Ling Shan county, then in Guangdong, now administered as part of Guangxi. This was an area which had many Zhuang. We do not know Li's origins, but he had close ties with Zhuang people which are evident in his later actions. He had fought well against the Taiping, leading a unit of the Ever Victorious Army, and become part of the entourage of the Qing commander Feng Zicai. Li Yangcai had followed Feng to Guangxi and had served with distinction in the campaigns against the Miao in Guizhou, against Taiping remnants, and against Wu Hezhong in Vietnam.[43] Li had a quarrel of some sort with Feng and was accused of looting in Vietnam. He was reduced in rank and posted to Guangdong. Li may have been a patriot or merely a self-aggrandizing bandit chieftain---he presents himself as the former and Qing sources portray him as the latter.

Stating that he could no longer stand by while France detached Vietnam, Li Yangcai forged a rescript and began raising money and recruiting troops in Ling Shan. From Ling Shan he moved into Guangxi and began recruiting in the border region, soon amassing a force of thousands, perhaps of tens of thousands.[44] His stated purpose was to remove the Nguyen from the Vietnamese throne, acting in concert with local Vietnamese gentry. The Nguyen, and the Le before them, Li said, had taken Vietnam away from its rightful lord, the Chinese Emperor. The weakness of the Nguyen invited French interference, as well as continually causing problems for China in the frontier region which the Nguyen was too weak too properly control. Li said, "If Vietnam falls, China's borders cannot be maintained; there will be no way to protect them."[45]

The Qing ordered Feng Zicai against him and Feng placed a blocking force at Zhen-nan pass, the major route into Vietnam. Li, however, simply split his force of very experienced former tuanlian and yong soldiers into four groups and filtered through the border at smaller passes, in August of 1878. Li Yangcai's success at raising men suggests that his cause was a popular one which combined not only ardent patriotism, but a chance to loot and pillage once again, operations with which every former soldier in the border region was intimately familiar, whether learned in imperial service or in that of the secret societies and the Taiping. Bandit gangs on either side of the frontier also began to join him.

This event presented grave problems for the Qing court. An immediate threat was that local Zhuang toumu would join him, creating a rising on the scale of the Taiping years.[46] It was repeatedly stressed that any toumu who refused to aid in suppressing Li would himself be treated as a rebel. The court saw in the affair a threat as great as that earlier presented by Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing.[47] Li was said to be a Ge Yuan, a revolutionary. The court's fear was not entirely alarmist. A plot was discovered in the first month of 1879 at Yongning to take advantage of the departure of Feng Zicai to rise up and seize the city. Loyal units were moved in to scotch the movement, which involved mutinous soldiers, probably local yong.[48] The possible ramifications of the affair widened when, in late 1878, the French ambassador demanded information. The Translation Bureau of the Foreign Affairs office soon reported that foreign papers were reporting on the incursion.[49]

Now thoroughly alarmed, the court ordered Feng Zicai to go into Vietnam after Li, as per the request of the Vietnamese throne. The Vietnamese earlier had attempted to stop Li, sending elephants against his cannon with unfortunate results. Feng recruited Zhuang yong, placed local scouts with each of his units, and pursued Li.

Liu Yongfu was also ordered against Li. Liu seems never to have made contact with Li's units, an odd circumstance as they moved in groups of several thousands through his territory around Longson. It is probable that Liu was either outmatched or concerned that his own Zhuang might not oppose Li's ostensible mission to reconquer Vietnam. The Zhuang toumu Zhao Wu from the Zuo river region, who had in 1875 attacked Huang Zongying in Vietnam, drove Li from Langson which he had occupied. When Zhao eventually drove Li to earth in the mountains in the fall of 1879, regular forces were brought up and he was taken and killed.

Other major bandit groups were still operating in Vietnam; Ye Chenglin, also said to be a Yellow-Black Flag leader, perhaps a survivor of Huang's Yellow Flags, was one of the more important ones, and the court had feared that Li and Ye would combine forces. The French had another, equally reasonable fear: that the Qing would grant Li a status like that of Liu Yongfu, increasingly an obstacle to their plans for expansion in the north. In 1879, Liu killed a French officer in an otherwise minor border skirmish. The French demanded assurance that Li Yangcai had no official standing and that the Vietnamese court had no intention of "soothing" survivors of the conflict, particularly Ye Chenglin, as they were supporting Liu Yongfu.[50] The eventual culmination of the events of the 1870's was the Sino-French War, which has been adequately dealt with in a number of works.[51]

In the Sino-French war the brunt of the fighting in the field fell upon the Yellow Flags, and upon the forces from Guangxi, in short, upon the Zhuang. One restriction upon the Chinese ability to reinforce their position was the awareness of officials such as Li Hongzhang, then a senior Chinese statesman, and Cen Yuying, the Governor-General of Yunnan-Guizhou, each of whom was at some point in command of the military in Tonkin, that northern soldiers would quickly perish there.[52]

The Chinese forces greatly outnumbered the French, but initially fighting on the defensive, suffered greatly from the far more modern weapons of the French. The Chinese did win important victories at Bac-le around Langson in June of 1884 and at Langson proper in March of 1885.[53] But the divisions at the Chinese court and the ability of the French to strike such critical Chinese assets as the cities of Keelung in Taiwan and Fuzhou in Fujian proved decisive. The treaty agreements increased the exposure of both China and Vietnam to additional French expansion.

For their part, the Zhuang learned that modern weaponry had far outstripped that with which they were familiar from the Taiping wars. Henceforth the ability to secure western breach-loading rifles was to be a major factor in the politics of the frontier, as critical a development as had been the introduction of cannon in the Ming era.

THE ZHUANG AND THE VIOLENCE OF THE LATE 19th CENTURY

The period after the Sino-French war (1884-5) was, like the periods before, during, and after the Taiping rebellion, an era of constant violence. Some local authorities traced the roots of the disorders following the Sino-French war to the long-term effects of the presence of Wu Hezhong in the frontier region.[54] However, the same factors which had given rise to the earlier periods of violence were still present. The weather cycle continued to be unrelievedly bad, the region remained over-populated and ruinously poor. The Taiping wars and the Sino-French war again brought large numbers of soldiers into Guangxi, many of whom inevitably chose to stay as the population density there was far below that of neighboring provinces like Hunan and Guangdong. One consequence of the population increase was additional pressure on land, and rents jumped once again.[55]

New factors also began to affect the region. The presence of the French on the southern borders contributed to a perception that the Manchus, themselves foreigners in the eyes of many chauvinistic Han, were selling the country out to the hated Lao Fan, the "Old Barbarians," the French.

As in the era before the Taiping, the social order was so fragile that any minor conflict had the potential for escalating into a major long-term disorder. At Sien prefecture in the southwest, for example, a Xiucai (scholar qualified to take the examinations) named Mo and his partner in an iron foundry quarrelled over profits; the partner had Mo arrested but he subsequently escaped. He raised several thousands of followers and proclaimed himself the Xun De Wang (King who Follows Virtue). He posted xiwen (Calls to Arms) throughout the county, stating:

The Emperor is a Wolf, lacking humanity, the officials and officers are tigers and robbers who tyrannize...there has been no government in the 18 counties (of Sien prefecture); we have had 200 years of this...the Han households oppose the Mongolian barbarians and planned to oppose the Qing and restore the Ming, but the court early used the policy of using barbarians to control barbarians and was successful.[56]

The rising lasted several years and finally required that Hunanese troops be brought in to put it down. It is noteworthy that Mo, whatever his ethnicity may have been (the name of his village suggests a Zhuang area), appeals here to Han anti-Manchuism, and although his rising probably involved many local Zhuang, the xiwen addresses all as Han.

Again as in the pre-Taiping era, demobilized soldiery were a big problem. For example, in Yongning county there was a man named Lei Ba who had followed Li Wencai into Vietnam, and at Li's defeat had joined a bandit gang. Feng Zicai somehow recruited him for the Sino-French war and he fought well against the French. At the conclusion of the war he again became a bandit and "sank into the grasses." The local governor tried to recruit him---probably as a yong commander---but he refused. He remained a noted outlaw in the border region until 1902 when he did become a yong brigade commander. After a change in officers above him he was no longer trusted and he and his men were disarmed under the pretext of being given new guns and shot from ambush on the parade ground at Longzhou.[57] This easy conversion of bandits to yong (and vice-versa) continually caused problems. As the county gazetteer at Yongning said, "If all the villages in the county didn't suffer disaster from the bandits, then they suffered it from the troops."[58]

Such disorders as these sometimes reached climactic proportions. At the Zhuang villages in Yongning county on the Zuo river, bandit gangs began to congregate in 1899. Their principal target, as in the Taiping era, was the commerce on the river. The gangs were so strong that they gained control over the area and troops had to be brought in from outside. After the pacification of 1902 the region was desolate and more than one thousand had died.[59]

These problems slowly impacted other areas. In the northwest at Luocheng county, by 1899 secret societies were again organizing and bandits filtering in from other regions.[60] At Yibei county, also in the northwest, by 1902 a group of more than a thousand bandits held an open Bai Tai secret society pledge ceremony and the local people fled to a fortified mountain zhai to avoid them. The following year a group of more than ten thousand attacked the zhai, killing many.[61] The gang moved south and in 1903 moved into Sien county in the southwest, twice attacking the county capital. Lu Rongting moved up from the south and drove them into the Three Dong where they were eventually shattered.

The "bandit wind" had risen again, and local officials grew increasingly desperate. In 1904 the county prefect ordered that tuanlian once again be organized.[62] The same solution was resorted to at Longan county, also in the southwest. There, the years from 1900 to 1903 brought drought, plague, and, inevitably, bandits, so active that "there was no place to flee to avoid them." There tuanlian were both revived and placed under a unified command.[63]

ZHUANG CULTURE IN THE LATE QING ERA

Many examples of local problems like those discussed above could be explored. More useful, however, to an understanding of Zhuang ethnicity, is analysis of the careers of some of the men who figured in the events of the years from the Sino-French war to the 1911 revolution. Social status as either members of the elite or members of the peasantry began to be an increasing influence upon the ethnic identification of hitherto Zhuang people.

There were many noted Zhuang literati of the period following the Sino-French war. By 1886, education had become so accessible to the Zhuang that many were routinely taking the exams and receiving degrees. Most of the Zhuang literati of the late Qing era were from Ningming, a district in Taiping prefecture of the southwest, very near Longzhou on the Vietnamese border. This location is southwest of Yongning, the center of the Zhuang literati in the pre-Taiping era; this new location indicates the steady movement of Han Chinese culture which had by the late Qing reached its geographic limits, the Vietnamese border. Ironically the financial mainstay of the area, and thus of its scholarship, was the opium trade.

Among the Ningming scholars was Li Shenchan, who studied at the Xiufeng Academy in Guilin with the noted Zhuang scholars Wei Fenghuo and Qin Haian. Li became a Provincial Scholar in 1846. He later headed a number of important local academies in Guangxi. He was a prolific and noted poet. Li cannot be said to be a defender of traditional culture. Among his works are several attacking local female shamans for the harm which they did to credulous country folk. He states that the origins of female shamanism lay in Vietnam. Other than showing a deep concern for the fate of the common folk in a deeply troubled age there is not otherwise much that is particularly noteworthy about his poetry.[64]

Huang Huanzong (1832-c. 1912) was from a poor family. His father was killed by a local official. Nonetheless he joined a local Tuanlian and saw service against Wu Lingyun. He later was connected with Liu Yongfu. His poetry shows a fierce nationalism which was manifested in intense admiration of Liu's achievements. He also criticized the Manchu government for its weakness before first the French, and later, the Japanese.[65]

Wei Ling'ge was from Yongning, the center of the Zhuang literati in the early Qing. Born after 1821, he was a noted student of history who had a disappointing career. He himself organized a local tuanlian and saw frequent service against the Taiping and the secret societies. He was, however, no facile apologist for the Qing. His poetry shows a deep awareness of the plight of the poor, and he expressed in such poems as "Sighs for the Lulin [Greenwoods bandits]" the belief that they had no recourse but rebellion: "Force people to become poor and they become bandits." He deeply regretted the violence of the time: "The guns and cannon of the tuanlian have become rare and valuable goods;" "Alas, alas, when will this turmoil end?" He saw the causes of the disorder as corruption and misgovernment and in very complicated and elliptical poems condemned the bureaucrats of his day as snakes, frogs, and tortoises, each with their own loathsome characteristics. Other poems spoke of the inevitable collapse of an elite which would "fall before the autumn wind." Despite his relative isolation in Guangxi he was very cosmopolitan and followed national affairs closely. In an era of intense hatred of the Japanese for their victory in the 1895 Sino-Japanese war, Wei lamented that the Chinese and Japanese, the descendants of common great ancestors, had inexplicably come to blows.[66] He sorrowed that in a world gone mad there was little that he could do beyond raising vegetables at his "Small Boat Villa" from whence comes the name of the major collection of his works. His son, Wei Xiumeng, also became a noted local poet.

Nong Shida (1873-1913) was also from Ningming and studied in Guilin. He harbored a fierce hatred of the Manchus. Like many young men he decided to pursue a military education and entered a military academy in Guangzhou which brought him to a teaching post in a similar academy in Guangxi. His racial anti-Manchuism put him into contact with revolutionary groups and he advocated revolution among Zhuang youth enrolled in the academies where he taught. In the winter of 1907, when Sun Yat-sen attacked Zhen Nan pass, Nong attempted to organize students in Sun's support but was unable to do so, perhaps because the attempt so quickly failed. The Guangxi governor removed him from his post for his revolutionary activities. When Sun was expelled from Tonkin by the French and went on to Singapore, Nong joined him after a stay in Canton. He became a follower of Sun and performed propaganda work in Guangxi for three years. He wrote many poems in those years, most expressing a very romantic determination to overthrow the Manchus or die trying. His poetry was deeply larded with obscure references to the Confucian Classics.

After the success of the 1911 revolution Nong Shida returned to Guangxi where he was very critical of the Guangxi Zhuang warlord Lu Rongting. He said of Lu: "In his right hand he held a rifle, in his left a bomb; when I saw Lu Rongting my soul and my innards sank." In 1913, when many southern provinces rose up against Yuan Shikai's usurpation, Nong became a leader of the group which supported Sun Yat-sen. Nong impetuously went to Lu's headquarters to urge him to support the anti-Yuan coalition and Lu unceremoniously had him killed.[67]

Nong Shida was totally Hanicized. His life shows a total commitment to Han racial anti-Manchuism and no hints of allegiance to Zhuang ethnicity or culture. We may assume from his career, which involved much propaganda work among Zhuang people, that his ability to speak Zhuang was important, but he probably thought of truly traditional Zhuang people as ignorant and backward. Among his poems was one expressing deep admiration for Ma Yuan, the Han general who conquered the south for the Qin: "For all my life I will bow my head before the Fubo General (Ma Yuan).[68]

The lives and works of the many other Zhuang literati of the late Qing are quite similar to those of Li Shenchan, Huang Huanzong, Wei Ling'ge, and Nong Shida. Their poetry and prose is of a much higher quality than that of their more purely Zhuang predecessors. None of them was a Zhuang save by birth; by culture they were Han, in most cases, ardently so. There are no noted Zhuang female poets from this era. The increased degree of Sinicization of Zhuang culture had much changed the circumstances which had permitted Zhuang women to write and establish a reputation, however minor, in the earlier period.

Many of the poets do, however, show a deep concern for the common people of Guangxi, and occasionally for the particular plight of poor women. This, however, in no way distinguishes them from Han poets of the era. The Zhuang literati of the late Qing then, are only Zhuang in retrospect. The scholars of the contemporary People's Republic of China, with a much keener awareness of ethnicity than their Han predecessors in the late Qing era, have identified them as Zhuang by birth, and have analyzed their works in the same manner as the work of minority poets and authors might be celebrated in the contemporary United States, regardless of ethnic content or meaning.

But the situation of Zhuang peasants was much different than that of the elite. Being born into a very troubled rural milieu where traditional Zhuang culture was still strong led to quite different lives for them. Among them were many rebels and bandits. The most successful of these, in that like Liu Yongfu he began as a bandit and ended as an honored member of the establishment, was Lu Rongting (1859-1928). Lu was born in what is today Wuming county, often said to be the contemporary center of the Zhuang in Guangxi. His father was beaten to death, some say, because he stole from his clan. Rongting's family was very poor.[69] Lu's mother, a member of the Ou clan, died when Lu was but five, and for two years he eked out an existence making umbrellas. While the next several years of his life are unclear, it is probable that he had begun working in various capacities in opium and gambling-related trades. At the age of 16 he was in Longzhou on the Vietnamese border, working as a boatman. By 1878 he had joined a secret society bandit gang operating in the frontier and soon led it from Shuikou. The gang was part of the cross-border trade in opium. Sometimes they functioned as simple bandits, much feared by the French in particular, sometimes as caravan guards or body-guards for opium traders.[70]

During the Sino-French war Lu joined a yong Battalion at Shuikou, his own territory. Lu fought well and at the conclusion of the war returned to banditry. Banditry in the frontier now inevitably had a quasi-political character as it involved resisting French attempts to pacify the region. Lu led a group of "twittering bandits" (Zhuang speakers).[71] The French finally became sufficiently annoyed to single Lu out and demand that the Chinese government curtail his activities. The Provincial Military Commander, Su Yuanqun, solved the problem by appointing Lu a Battalion officer in the Yong, enrolling his relatives as lower-ranking officers, and charging them with controlling the area in which they operated. By 1902 Lu was the Battalion Commander.[72] When his patron Su retired, Lu was supported by the Liang-Guang Governor-General Cen Qunxuan (b. 1861), the third son of Cen Yuying.[73] While we do not reckon that Cen Yuying was in any sense a Zhuang, because his family had been entirely Hanicized by his generation, both men no doubt found their common origins in Guangxi an important tie between them.

Being enrolled in the government forces had some liabilities for Lu in that it precluded any additional spectacular feats of banditry in the frontier, but he proved more than equal to the challenge. In 1904 there was an attempt to disband many of the yong during a military reorganization, but Lu pointed out that his forces, most of whom were Zhuang drawn from Wuming, would have no alternative but to return to banditry. Moreover, if they were dispersed, then they would not be available in the event of a sudden problem on the border.

Lu's concern, while obviously self-serving, was well-founded. As Sun Yat-sen became more active in the frontier region, it was Lu who stood ready to oppose him. Lu's new status gave him access to modern weapons and he was quick to learn their use. In 1907 when Sun Yatsen's forces, relying heavily upon local Zhuang, attacked Zhen-nan pass, the force which drove them out, also heavily Zhuang, was led by Lu Rongting. Among the weapons which Lu deployed was a battery- or generator-driven flood light which enabled his forces to operate at night.[74] The fact that Lu had remained loyal at a potentially critical juncture further recommended him to higher authorities and he was given command of the You river forces, the border units of the southwest, and in 1909, he added those of the Zuo river to his command. Lu was now the most powerful of the native Guangxi people. His dominance in the southwest and the border region also gave him control over the opium traffic.[75] By 1910 Lu was the military arbiter of the frontier region, and widely regarded as the man who must hold back the French in the event of renewed aggression.[76]

When the 1911 revolution finally broke out and the local New Armies forces sided with the revolutionaries, Lu was then the Vice-Commander of Guangxi. When the Commander-in Chief resigned because he himself was not from Guangxi and felt that he would not be able to control the situation, Lu Rongting became the titular as well as the real power in Guangxi.[77] Lu later resisted the blandishments of Yuan Shikai to gain control of the south and rather set Guangxi off on a path of marked autonomy.[78]

Wang Hexun (1871-1934) was born in Nazao village in Yongning county of a poor Zhuang family.[79] He became a guard at the local yamen, serving with Li Ba. In 1884 Li and Wang were sent to break up a secret society at the county town but rather allied with the bandits, forming a group which they termed "bandit catchers." The local historians, despite being somewhat jaded from chronicling decades of chaos, said of them "There was no evil which they did not do." As they maintained the facade of official status, the local government decided it was better to leave them in their putative rank and did not act against them lest they go into open revolt.[80] During this same period Wang is said to have fought under Liu Yongfu at the age of fourteen and fifteen, the equivalent of a captain in the Black Flags during the Sino-French war.[81]

By 1900 Wang Hexun was the most prominent leader of the local secret societies and went into open banditry, killing and burning over a wide area villages which resisted him. He occasionally cooperated with bandit leaders of neighboring counties to conduct joint raids.[82] He had large forces under him and was well-armed because he was by then tapping the opium trade and could secure modern guns in Tonkin where many arms merchants were operating.[83]

Local forces were finally reorganized in 1905 to deal with the increasing menace of the growing bandit gangs. This reorganization followed the successful pattern established by the mopping-up campaigns of the late Taiping era. Local tuanlian were revivified and began to act in concert so that the bandits could no longer flee from an area of heightened police activity into an area with weak security forces. The authorities proclaimed martial law and monitored all ferries and boats at critical crossings. Systematic attacks then saturated the "nest" areas and the tuanlian forces combined to run the bandits to earth in the mountains.[84] Following the suppression campaign, Wang Hexun alone escaped into Vietnam where he established himself as a local power in the frontier region, living off the opium trade. [85]

Another of the prominent Zhuang leaders was Huang Mingtang (1866-1938). Born in today's Qinzhou region of Guangxi of a poor Zhuang family, Huang early joined the secret societies and was known as Huang Ba or Ba Ge (Huang Eight or Eighth Brother) from his birth-order among many brothers. Huang was strong and bold and by 1903 had become a leader in the region of the You river. Driven to the Vietnamese frontier by the tuanlian campaigns of 1905, Huang established a base area around Zhen-nan pass into Vietnam, and, like Wang Hoxun, lived off the opium trade. Huang and Wang both became involved with Sun Yatsen as described below.[86]

Another important Zhuang leader of these years was Huang Shouzhong. Because he had been poor and without prospects, Huang's father, born a Lo, had agreed to be adopted into the Huang family to marry their daughter. Huang Shouzhong, born of this marriage, later established a joint clan temple to the Huang and Lo clan, perhaps a vestige of Zhuang bilateralism. Shouzhong was illiterate and spoke Chinese very badly his entire life. Huang Shouzhong was born at today's Ningming county, a Zhuang area, and like many other young Zhuang, was strong, bold, and rebellious. He became one of Liu Yongfu's "Three Tiger Generals," leading the Front Battalion, most of whom were Zhuang, in the Black Flags.[87] The Front Battalion was slightly larger than both the Left and Right Battalions combined and was the core of Liu Yongfu's Black Flag force. During the Sino-French War Liu and Huang quarreled, and Huang later led two Battalions of his men into the Qing regular forces.

There is no question, in the cases of Lu Rongting, Wang Hexun, Huang Mingtang, and Huang Shouzhong, but that their ethnicity as Zhuang was important, though it is difficult to be precise as to the exact manner in which it functioned.[88] Certainly the beginnings of all four of these men were dependent upon their ability to raise and command Zhuang yong in the frontier. The careers of all of them, except perhaps for Lu Rongting, depended entirely upon their ability to continue to hold the loyalty of Zhuang people and to operate in the traditionally Zhuang regions. Huang Shouzhong is a transitional figure between Huang Mingtang, Wang Hexun, and Lu Rongting in that, like Lu, he became a member of the Qing forces. Unlike Lu, however, he seems never to have widened his military base to include non-Zhuang soldiery in any appreciable number.

Lu Rongting differs from the others in that he did establish a wider base which involved the support of many Han people, as well as of Zhuang. As he rose to provincial and then regional importance and the politics in which he involved himself became increasingly complicated, his ethnicity became a factor of decreasing importance. But he may not truly be an exception in that the foundation of his power was always military and its core was the Zhuang soldiery of the southwest.[89] His clique, known as the "Old Gui" or Old Guangxi clique to distinguish it from Li Zongren's New Gui clique, was based on family ties and the place of origin of his followers in the south and west.[90] Most of his subordinates were themselves Zhuang. It is probable that had he not been a Zhuang Lu Rongting would never have succeeded in rising to prominence in southern Guangxi.

THE ZHUANG AS OF 1900

The very different lives of the eight Zhuang people whose biographies were discussed immediately above show that Zhuang ethnicity was, by the late Qing era, much affected by circumstances of birth. In the pre-Taiping era this was not so much the case. In the pre-Taiping period Zhuang ethnicity was sufficiently strong that Zhuang elites and common Zhuang people alike were not likely to become Hanicized to the point where ethnicity was no longer a factor in their lives. This was in part because the tusi system depended upon local elites maintaining status within Zhuang culture and organizations. The Qing reform of the tusi system began to diminish this aspect of the system, making elite status within the parameters of traditional Zhuang definitions less attractive. Another support of Zhuang elite status in the pre-Taiping era had been a negative one: Zhuang elites had no real alternative to maintaining their status as Zhuang; they could not easily become Han. This was because the Han society had not yet developed in Guangxi to the point where significant numbers of Zhuang elites could receive the necessary educations to cross over, initially "passing" as Han, and in later generations, like Cen Yuying's sons, actually becoming Han. By the Taiping era, however, even Zhuang in the southwest, as indicated by the careers of the late Qing Ningming literati, could receive education, win degrees, and function as superior examples of Chinese literati. The earlier generations of Zhuang literati were little more than cultural curiosities but the later generations had official careers and some became truly distinguished poets and writers. And the four discussed above, Li Shenchan, Huang Huanzong, Wei Ling'ge, and Nong Shida all in their way served the Han, as tuanlian leaders or warriors, or, like Nong, as spokesmen for Han anti-Manchuism.

The careers of the non-elite Zhuang discussed here, Lu Rongting, Wang Hexun, Huang Mingtang, and Huang Shouzhong, were quite different than those of the elite. Their future could not depend on a mastery of Han language and culture which they basically had no way to acquire, but rather on an ability to recruit and lead Zhuang soldiery in battle. They were not only, unlike the elite, born into families which were entirely Zhuang in language and culture but their future depended upon remaining Zhuang, a situation quite the opposite of that facing the elite.

The situation facing the Zhuang as of about 1880, when compared to that of about 1840, differed then, in this important respect: The Zhuang elite by 1880 were both able to and desirous of adopting Han identities. The advantages to elites in remaining Zhuang had been much reduced by the changes within the tusi system, and there was an accompanying widening of the access to and rewards from Han culture. Had this been the only important change, however, the situation might not have differed appreciably from that facing the Qing at the onset of the Taiping rebellion. at that time, although not supported by local elites, risings, including Zhuang risings, were endemic in Guangxi as the poor rebelled. But Zhuang non-elites had also gained some advantages by 1880, reducing their propensity to attack the Chinese social and political system.

The military units of the post-Taiping area known as the yong have been largely ignored, perhaps because their amorphous identity does not lend itself to analysis. From the viewpoint of the non-elite Zhuang, however, the yong were a very critical development. From the time that the Ming had begun to limit the tusi system, a policy which the Qing continued, there had been no legitimate local military employment for the Zhuang, among the most martial of the world's ethnic groups, with a history of employment as mercenaries going back perhaps two millennia. The Taiping rebellion had provided such employment, with tragic results as the Zhuang had not yet been adequately integrated into Han society to serve its purposes, nor did they remain under the control of their own traditional elites whose status had been steadily diminished by the slow constriction of the Tusi system. Now, with the advent of the yong, the Zhuang found a new sort of status. The leaders of the yong groups were chosen by the time-honored Zhuang method of violent struggle, a Darwinian process which rewarded personal strength and battle-field cunning.

The yong offered something new which had not even been provided by the tusi system itself: an avenue of advancement for Zhuang of low origins. The Qing tusi system had recognized and promoted only existing elites. The Yuan and Ming system had permitted a degree of conflict to gain control over tusi posts, and new leaders could bring their clans to prominence, but the Qing system had closed off that avenue of mobility with its very close regulation of territorial limits and succession rights. Since the Qing had begun to control the system, the only opportunity offered for advancement had been through the secret societies and the bandit gangs. The Taiping had attracted both elites and the capable members of lower strata, but were not a solution to the government's problem of stabilizing the Zhuang. The yong offered that potential, permitting men like Lu Rongting and Huang Shouzhong to began as bandits, but to rise to status as Qing military leaders. And as the late Qing era introduced competitors to the Qing in the presence of the nascent republican forces, men like Huang Mingtang and Wang Hexun could begin as bandits, continue to oppose the government, and eventually acquire status as Min Zhun (People's Army) leaders in the new Republic.

The importance of the yong also depended upon an additional factor. For generations the importance of the Zhuang had lain in their utility in defending the Sino-Vietnamese frontier where Han Chinese regular forces could operate only at great cost and with grave difficulty. Had the Qing succeeded in occupying Vietnam, or the increasing weakness of the Vietnamese throne vitiated the threat presented by the frontier, the Qing might have continued to simply suppress the Zhuang, as in the situation prior to the Taiping rebellion. Suppression would have been greatly facilitated, of course, by the defection of the Zhuang elite as they continuously became Han. But the sudden appearance of the French once again charged the region with menace, and the Zhuang became, once again, the military guarantors of the frontier, as evidenced by the careers of the Black Flag leaders under Liu Yongfu, and by the career of Lu Rongting.

The institutional changes of the late Qing then, had partially solved the problem of stabilizing local Zhuang society. Zhuang elites were drawn into Han culture and transformed; non-elites were given new avenues which permitted them to move from bandits to yong, a system analogous to the functions of the old tusi system, but without its necessary accommodation of Zhuang elites. And the unstable frontier guaranteed a continued dependance upon the martial abilities of the Zhuang.

[1]. Zhonghua Minguo Kaiguo Wushinian Wenxia Biancuan Weiyuanhui (ed.) [Commitee on the Complilation of Documents on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of China, ed.] Zhonghua Minguo Kaiguo Wushinian Wenxian., [Documents on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of China], First Series, Vol 3 and 4, Liechiang Qinlue [The aggression of the Powers]., Taipei: 1964. Vol II, p. 473.

[2]. For details of the period before 1862 see Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam, Histoire et Civilisation. [Vietnamese History and Civilization] Paris: Les editions De Minuit, 1955., pp 366-67.

[3]. Zhonghua Minguo Kaiguo Wushinian Wenxia Biancuan Weiyuanhui (ed.) [Commitee on the Complilation of Documents on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of China, ed.] Zhonghua Minguo Kaiguo Wushinian Wenxian., [Documents on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Republic of China], First Series, Vol 3 and 4, Liechiang Qinlue [The aggression of the Powers]., Taipei: 1964. Vol II, p. 473.; Xiao Yi-shan, Qingdai Tongshi, [A Comprehensive History of the Qing] Five Volumes, Taipei: 1967, III, p. 493.

[4]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. 1233, 1244.

[5]. Wang Chimin, "Qingdai Yongying Zhidu", [The Qing Era Yong Battalion System] pp. 1-87 in Qingli Junshishi Lunji, [A Collection of Perspectives on the Qing-era Military History] Taipei: Lianjing Quban shiye Gongsi, 1980., p. 7-8.

[6]. Wang Chimin, "Qingdai Yongying Zhidu", [The Qing Era Yong Battalion System] pp. 1-87 in Qingli Junshishi Lunji, [A Collection of Perspectives on the Qing-era Military History] Taipei: Lianjing Quban shiye Gongsi, 1980. p. 15-17; 43.

[7]. de La Jonquiere, E. Lunet. Ethnographie du Tonkin Septentrional. (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1906) p. 29.

[8]. Huang Jiamu, "Qinglide Guangxi Bianfang" [Qing-era Border Defenses in Guangxi] pp 29-105 in Jindai Shi Yanjiusuo Jikan, 15th Qi, 1985. :29.

[9]. Ningming Zhou-zhi [Ningming Zhou Gazeteer] (1884) Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1970 :123.

[10]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. 1456. For biography see Hummel, Arthur W. 1967. Ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912. Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing House.

[11]. Baise Ting-zhi [Baise-Ting Gazeteer] (1892) Taipei: Chenwen Chubanshe, 1968. p. 144

[12]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. 1456-8. Tan Gaoji, Taiping Tianguo Shiqi Zhuangzu Nongmin Qi Yi. [The Zhuang Peasant Risings during the Period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1988., states that Wu's general, Zhao, savaged Feng's rear guard and had to be driven off by local forces from Taiping prefecture. p. 132-3.

[13]. Murray, Dian H., Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810. (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1987.) p. 29.

[14]. Baise Ting-zhi [Baise-Ting Gazeteer] (1892) Taipei: Chenwen Chubanshe, 1968. p. 144.

[15]. Tan Gaoji, Taiping Tianguo Shiqi Zhuangzu Nongmin Qi Yi. [The Zhuang Peasant Risings during the Period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1988., p. 133.

[16]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. p. 1458.

[17]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 68.

[18]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 69.

[19]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 76.

[20]. Long'an Xian-zhi, [Long'an County Gazeteer] (1934) Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1975. p. 36.

[21]. Biographical data from Zheng Shuiming, Qingdai Yuenande Huaqiao, [The Overseas Chinese of Vietnam in the Qing Era.] Taipei: Jiaxin Cement Corp. Cultural Foundation, n.d. (f. 1971). p. 34. (Ph.d. Diss, National Taiwan Teachers' University). p. 34.

[22]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d. Gx Yuan nian, I;p. 1., doc #1. Letter of Cen Yuying of 3/13.

[23]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 23.

[24]. The name may indicate the symbolic color of the unit, just as Liu's were known as the Black Flags, but it equally may simply indicate Huang's unit as his name might also be translated as "Yellow."

[25]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d. I: p. 1., docu #1. Yunnan Xunfu Cen Yuying, 3/13/1875. Some corroboration of this may be indicated in the accounts of local people who also believed that the French had paid monies to Huang to support their interests in the region, and took a terrible revenge upon him when he failed to do so. See Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 24, 26.

[26]. Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam, Histoire et Civilisation. [Vietnamese History and Civilization] Paris: Les editions De Minuit, 1955., p. 373.

[27]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982. p. 26-7.

[28]. Fan Hong-gui, "Huang Shouzhong" pp. 102-110 in Zhuang-zu Li-shi Ren-wu Zhuan, Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Qubanshe, 1982. p. 103.

[29]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols., III:692.

[30]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982., p. 30-31.

[31]. Liang Zhiming, "Liu Yongfu Hei Qizhun Wei Zhong-Yueh Renminde Zhandou Youi," [The Struggle of Liu Yongfu's Black Flag Army in the Service of the Friendship of the Sino-Vietnamese Peoples.] pp. 191-202 in Liu Zhunda (ed.) Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Lunwenji [A Collection of Treatises on the Sino-French War) Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. p. 193.

[32]. Zhong-Fa Zhanzheng Diaocha Ciliao Shilu. [The Veritable Record of the Materials of the Investigation of the Sino-French War] Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhichu Bowuguan Xiuding. (The Museum of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) (ed.) Guangxi Renmin Chubanse, Nanning: 1982., p. 31.

[33]. See Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam, Histoire et Civilisation. [Vietnamese History and Civilization] Paris: Les editions De Minuit, 1955., p. 369; for weights and measures see p. 533.

[34]. Li Zongren and Tang Degang, Li Zongren Hui-i Lu. [Memoirs of Li Zongren], Taipei: n.d., n.p., p. 40. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986. 37.

[35]. Baise Ting-zhi [Baise-Ting Gazeteer] (1892) Taipei: Chenwen Chubanshe, 1968, p. 144.

[36] JHM QL :30-1.???

[37]. Baise Ting-zhi [Baise-Ting Gazeteer] (1892) Taipei: Chenwen Chubanshe, 1968., p. 145. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d.I:44

[38]. Cady, John F., The Roots of French Imperialism, New York: 1954. pp. 280-1. See also Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, 3rd edition. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.)p. 654-5.

[39]. Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam, Histoire et Civilisation. [Vietnamese History and Civilization] Paris: Les editions De Minuit, 1955., p. 372. See also Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, 3rd edition. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.) p. 657.

[40]. Le Thanh Khoi, Le Viet-Nam, Histoire et Civilisation. [Vietnamese History and Civilization] Paris: Les editions De Minuit, 1955., p. ??? .

[41]. Eastman, Lloyd E. Thrones and Mandarins. Cambridge, Mass., 1967., p. 33.

[42]. Xiao Yi-shan, Qingdai Tongshi, [A Comprehenesive History of the Qing] Five Volumes, Taipei: 1967, III, p. 1058.

[43]. See Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. 1461; for Feng Zicai see Hummel, Arthur W. 1967. Ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912. Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing House. Feng Tsu-ts'ai, p. 244.

[44]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d I:p. 72, #47.

[45]. Li's announcement of his purposes to the Chinese throne is summarized in Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. p. 1462.

[46]. See Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d.I:89.

[47]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d.I:90, #56.

[48]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. p. 1463.

[49]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d.I:102, #69.

[50]. Guo Tingyi, Zhong-Fa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang. [The Record of Sino-French Negotiations over Vietnam] Seven Volumes. Taiwan: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuso Bian, n.d. I:87, #56.

[51]. See Eastman, Lloyd E. Thrones and Mandarins. Cambridge, Mass., 1967., and Cady, John F., The Roots of French Imperialism, New York: 1954., passim.

[52]. Eastman, Lloyd E. Thrones and Mandarins. Cambridge, Mass., 1967., p. 74; 171;

[53]. Eastman, Lloyd E. Thrones and Mandarins. Cambridge, Mass., 1967., p. 125 ;171

[54]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols. p. 1459.

[55]. Tan Gaoji, Taiping Tianguo Shiqi Zhuangzu Nongmin Qi Yi. [The Zhuang Peasant Risings during the Period of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom], Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1988., p. 3.

[56]. Si-En Xianzhi, [The Si-en County Gazeteer) 1935. Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju: 1968., p. 26l-r.

[57]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols., 1490.

[58]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols., 1483.

[59]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols., 1483-4.

[60]. Luocheng Xian-zhi [Luocheng County Gazeteer] (1935) Taipei: Chenwen Chubanshe, 1975 , p. 281.

[61]. Yibei Xian-zhi [Yibei District Gazeteer] 1937, Reprinted Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1968. , p. 102.

[62]. Si-En Xianzhi, [The Si-en County Gazeteer) 1935. Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju: 1968., p., 26-7.

[63]. Long'an Xian-zhi, [Long'an County Gazeteer] (1934) Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1975. :23.

[64]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols. III, 1017-1020.

[65]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols. III: 1042-1051.

[66]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols. III: 1065-69.

[67]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols. III: 1079. See also Huang Biqin, p. 160.

[68]. Ou-yang Ruoxiu, Huang Qingshao, Zhou Zuoqiu, Zhuangzu Wenxue Shi. [A History of Zhuang Literature.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1986. Three Vols. III: 1077-1079.

[69]. Huang Biqin, "Lu Rongting," pp. 158-170 in Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Guangxi Lishi Renwu Zhuan. [Biographies of Guangxi Historical Personages.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1982. p. 158.

[70]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., p. 38.

[71]. Li Zongren and Tang Degang, Li Zongren Hui-i Lu. [Memoirs of Li Zongren], Taipei: n.d., n.p., p. 40.

[72]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., p. 40.

[73]. See Hummel, Arthur W. 1967. Ed. Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912. Taipei: Ch'eng-wen Publishing House. p. 745.

[74]. Barlow, Jeffrey G., "Vietnam and the Chinese Revolution of 1911.", Ph.D. Dissertation in History, University of California, Berkeley, 1973. PP?

[75]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., p. 44-45.

[76]. Minli Bao, [The People's Stand] 1910, 10 month 13 day, p. 3.

[77]. See Li Zongren and Tang Degang, Li Zongren Hui-i Lu. [Memoirs of Li Zongren], Taipei: n.d., n.p. p. 39.

[78]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., p. 96.

[79]. Huang Biqin, "Wang Hexun," pp. 121-130 in Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Guangxi Lishi Renwu Zhuan. [Biographies of Guangxi Historical Personages.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1982. p. 121-2.

[80]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols.:1499-1500.

[81]. Huang Biqin, "Wang Hexun," pp. 121-130 in Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Guangxi Lishi Renwu Zhuan. [Biographies of Guangxi Historical Personages.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1982. p. 121. Wang, like Huang Mingtang discussed below, and to a degree like Lu Rongting and Liu Yongfu, became noted local figures, and in the case of Wang and Huang, important supporters of Sun Yatsen. There is thus a marked politicization of the manner in which they are treated, primarily by the historians of the R.O.C. who treat them hagiographically, but even by those of the P.R.C., who are inclined to see them as Zhuang "Rightous Bandits." But the local gazeteers of the era are unanimous in treating the two as exceptionally brutal and murderous. It is possible that Wang did not serve with Lu at all, as he was said in the Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols., to have been engaged in active banditry at Yongning during this period. It is possible that the story of serving with Liu was a convenient way to later fill in this period in his history with heroic and suitably nationalistic deeds, while also obscuring his earlier banditry.

[82]. Long'an Xian-zhi, [Long'an County Gazeteer] (1934) Taipei: Chengwen Chubanshe, 1975. :23.

[83]. See L'Avenir Du Tonkin, 7/19/1908, Chronique de Haiphong-Les Armes." and :'Indochine Francaise, 5/15/1908 "Les Armes a Feu dans L'Interieure." Great Britain, Foreign Office. Public Record Office and Annex, London. 405/182, FCAC LXII, Jan/June 1908 Monthly Summary of Events in China, #198, p. 266 reported that a Greek had been arrested for selling guns on the Tonkin border. Another source of supply was Hong Kong. Great Britain, Foreign Office. Public Record Office and Annex, London. 405/175 FC AC, LXI. p. 97, Inclosure in #63.

[84]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols.:1494.

[85]. Yongning Xian-zhi, [Yongning County Gazeteer] 1937, Taipei: Cheng-wen Chubanshe, 1975. Five Vols., 1500.

[86]. Xing Fenglin, "Huang Mingtang," pp. 110-121 in Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Guangxi Zhuang-zu Renwu Zhuan. [Biographies of Zhuang Historical Personages.] Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1982. p. 110.. Huang's later status was similar to that of Wang Hexun as he too fought in several of Sun's risings in the Vietnamese frontier and was henceforth treated as a "Rightous Bandit" in the preceeding years. He is mentioned much less often in the local materials and was perhaps less predatory than was Wang.

[87]. Fan Hong-gui, "Huang Shouzhong" pp. 102-110 in Zhuang-zu Li-shi Ren-wu Zhuan, Guangxi Minzu Xueyuan Minzu Yanjiu Shipian, (eds.) Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Qubanshe, 1982. p. 103.

[88]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., expresses scepticism that Lu's ethnicity was Zhuang, asking "Because his ancestors included one or two Zhuang, should he be regarded as a Zhuang? It is to be substantiated." p. 49, note 2. I would argue, to the contrary, that Lu was clearly a Zhuang, and that his ethnicity was important, as indicated above. Huang Yiqian's otherwise admirable study essentially incorporates the attitudes of the Republican era toward ethnicity, a problem discussed below in some detail.

[89]. Lu later was treated by the historians of the P.R.C. as an essentially evil political leader, a local warlord. When I visited Wuming county in 1984 I made trips to local spots which were tied to Lu, including his former villa situated on a bend of a local river, where the water slowed and formed a stunningly beautiful emerald-green pool. I was several times told by Zhuang people that while they knew that Lu was said to have been a bad leader, from their private standpoint he had been very good to the local Zhuang people.

[90]. Huang Yiqian, Lu Rongting Yu Guangxi. Cheng Chih University, R.O.C., Taipei, Ph.D. dissertation in History, 1986., p. 227, 228.

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Dr. Jeffrey Barlow is a specialist in the history of the Sino-Vietnamese frontier region and the author of four books and numerous articles published in the U.S., Taiwan, India, China, and Singapore. He has lived in East Asia for more than six years. He has received two Fulbright grants for study in Taiwan and is a frequent traveler to China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Japan. He holds the Matsushita Chair of Asian Studies at Pacific University. He is the editor of the Journal of the American Association of History and Computing and the President of the Association of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast (ASPAC). He is also the Faculty Coordinator of the Berglund Center for Internet Studies (BCIS). For a web-based presentation (under construction) of Jeffrey Barlow's work on the Zhuang, see: http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/resources/zhuang/welcome.html

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