Vietnam's Overseas Trade in the 19th Century: The Singapore Connection
An image appeared here in the original.
Introduction
The Nguyen dynasty has long been seen as uniquely "reactionary" in Vietnamese history, and the 19th century as an opportunity lost. Both colonial and Vietnamese nationalist historians held that early 19th century Vietnam kept a Confucian close-the-door policy and that unless pressured by outside forces, it remained static and unchanging. Moreover, this allegedly policy was the source of Vietnam's impoverishment in the nineteenth century.[1]
Certainly these views have been revisited and are slowly changing. [2] In this paper I intend to bring in some ever existing but overlooked data by the Vietnam specialists, to examine the 19th century trade between Singapore and Vietnam. In my view it represents some new dimensions of Vietnamese experience of the first half of the 19th century.
A dramatic increase of shipping
Vietnam's export capacity was limited in the 1810s, when it was still struggling to recover from the damage of the civil wars in the late 18th century. The total tonnage in the early 1820s was definitely less than 30,000 a year, judged on Crawfurd's estimation in 1823.[3] Yet shipping increased remarkably in the following decades. Vietnam's trade with Singapore, for example, was about 4,000 tons in 1823.[4] This figure was more than doubled at about 10, 000 tons in 1839, and by 1857 it reached 31,000 tons, or a seven folds growth, as can be seen from graph 1 (1000 ton)[5]:
An image appeared here in the original.
This growth is even more striking, if we consider another important direction of trade - Vietnam's export to China, in the same period. Crawfurd estimated in 1823 that Vietnam's export to China was at about 20,000 tons a year,[6] or about five times that of its trade with Singapore. This proportion more or less remained the same in the 19th century. Vietnam's rice exported to China/Hong Kong, for example, was 4.65 times its export to Singapore, between 1866 and 1869. In 1866, Vietnam's rice exported to China/Hong Kong was 127,000 tons, itself a 6.3 times growth of the total Sino-Viet trade of 1823.[7]
All the figures above suggest a dramatic 6-7 times growth in Vietnam's export capacity, in the first half of the 19th century. This growth would place Vietnam quite favourably in terms of overseas trade, in comparison with its neighbours in Mainland Southeast Asia. As the following table shows, while in 1825 Cochinchina's trade with Singapore was only about one quarter of that of Siam, by 1845 it caught up with the latter.[8]
Singapore's trade with Mainland Southeast Asia, 1825-1865[9]
Percentage of Total
($ in millions)
1825
1845
1865
%
%
%
Burma
-
11
33
Cambodia
-
-
2
Cochinchina
21
46
23
Thailand
79
42
42
Total
$0.7
$1.0
$8.7
I will not extend my discussion to such growth's economic bases, but the following figures will give us a rough idea about it. The area of cultivated land in the country between 1820 and 1847, for instance, increased by more than one third,[10] and the number of taxpayers increased almost at the same speed, from 719,510 of 1820 to 1,024,388 of the 1840s.[11] All this suggest a substantial growth in Vietnam's economy in the first half of the 19th century.
What I want to consider in this paper is this: what is new in this 19th century growth?
A new trading direction
There is no doubt that China had been the major market of Vietnam's export for centuries. Even the new development in the Mekong delta region in the 18th and 19th centuries did not break this traditional pattern. In 1809, for example, a junk from Amoy was recorded as trading with the Dong Nai (Gia Dinh) area, most likely for rice. The size of this junk was quite large, having 561 people on board.[12] A considerable volume of trade and commercial interaction must have existed between China and Vietnam at this time; an example is a report by the Governor-General of China's Guangdong and Guangxi in 1828. According to him, a striking 60-70% of the coins circulating in Guangdong were cast in Vietnam.[13]
There was certainly variations of trade pattern in Vietnam's long history, Dang Trong (Cochinchina) under the Nguyen lords had fairly frequent trade with other Southeast Asian ports in the 17th and 18th centuries.[14] Yet it was not until the establishment of Singapore did Vietnam begin a regular, consistent and increasing trade with any Southeast Asian ports. What made this change?
All this started from something new in the 18th century Mekong delta, identified by Prof. Nguyen Dinh Dau. He pointed out although rice had always been produced in virtually every region where Vietnamese resided, before the Vietnamese obtained the Mekong Delta, it had never been produced on a large scale as a trade commodity.[15] The acquisition of the Mekong Delta to produce rice for commercial purposes was undoubtedly one of the most momentous episodes in eighteenth century Cochinchina, and a significant event of Vietnamese history. Having this staple product from the region was vital for the development of the Mekong delta. It was on the production of rice and rice trade that Saigon was founded and Nguyen Anh gained his victory over the Tay Son.[16] Yet it must have been suffered during the Tay Son period, and only began picking up again in the 1810s.
This timing was almost coincident with the founding of Singapore in 1819, where a large quantity of rice was increasingly needed to feed its immigrants and the Archipelago region. Vietnam responded favourably to this new situation and soon made itself important in the Singapore trade. As Crawfurd observed in 1822, the No.1 trade partner of Singapore was Siam, and next came Saigon.[17] What then were the cargoes from Vietnam?
A list of new cargo: sugar, salt and rice
If Hoi An's prosperity was based on the triangle trade between China, Japan and central Vietnam, characterised with luxury cargoes such as calambac, silk and deer hides, then Saigon was built more on its trade relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours, especially Singapore, with bulk trade cargoes such as rice, sugar and salt.
This situation might be attributed to the changed nature of bulk trade within Southeast Asian countries, started in the 18th century.[18] It placed Vietnamese in a position where they could afford to trade rice, sugar and salt with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Graph 2 looks at Vietnam's export to Singapore by major items:
An image appeared here in the original.
As can be seen from the graph above, sugar was the principle Vietnamese export to Singapore in the early 19th century. From 1841 to 1845, however, rice exports increased about ten fold and in 1848 this figure again doubled. This rise was the principle contributor to the peak shown in Graph 1. Rice exports continued to grow to a value of 300,448 Spanish dollars, while sugar never grew above a level of 146,396.
A remarkable feature of Vietnam's trade in this period was that the main cargo - rice, sugar and salt - were almost exclusively from the former Dang Trong (Cochinchina) region. Tongking or the north was known for its major products such as raw silk and cinnamon, but both were insignificant on the list of Vietnam-Singapore trade. Vietnam's trade with Singapore with rice as its paramount cargo, was a significant departure from Vietnam's economic order and its trade pattern. It was also a new window showing a different world to the Nguyen officials, which we will discuss below.
A new agent of the trade
Crawfurd's report of 1823 suggests a most remarkable party in the Vietnam-Singapore trade :
Exclusive of the junks, I should mention that there have arrived every year, for the last three, from the Cochinchinese capital, a merchant-ship and bring belonging to his Cochin Chinese Majesty, who, notwithstanding his Chinese prejudices, has lately become enamoured of the details and profits of trade.[19]
While this proved that the Nguyen court traded to Singapore yearly in the early 1820s, further evidence was founded in Chau Ban, the Vermilion Books of the Nguyen dynasty's original documents, about the royal shipping. One royal ship was recorded trading to Ha Chau[20] in 1824[21], and another four in 1825, to Batavia and Singapore.[22] This royal trade seemed to have carried on quite regularly to the 1840s, as shown by a Singapore official report in 1846: "Between Cochinchina and Singapore, exhibits a very favourable aspect in 1845-46...during the year five ships, equals to tons 2,400, belonging to the king of Cochinchina, arrived here with full cargoes..."[23]
The main cargo of this royal trade seemed to be sugar, at least so in the 1820s. According to one document of Chau Ban year 1824, there was 536 piculs (32, 216 kg) of sugar remained unsold in the returning royal ship from Ha Chau.[24] This commodity, again according to Chau Ban, was bought in advance by the Nguyen officers from the villagers of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam for a quantity of up to 3400 piculs yearly.[25] It is reasonable to assume that at least one thousand piculs per year were brought to Singapore by the royal ship, if 536 piculs could be left on board with the case above. Vietnam's sugar traded to Singapore in 1830 was at a level of 1300 picul per year.[26] This would make the Nguyen court the major, if not the principle, contributor of the sugar trade to Singapore in the 1820s and 30s. In other words, the Nguyen court was an active agent of the sugar trade, collecting the raw material from the country and trading it overseas.
35,000 piculs of sugarcane and 40,000 piculs of pepper were collected in 1822 as royal monopolies in Thailand. (Crawfurd, p.381)
The quantity of sugar that the court traded to Singapore seems to suggest a royal monopoly of sugar trade. This would make the Nguyen court share similar characteristics with the Siamese kings in Bangkok, but far removed from the practice of the Chinese emperors in Peking. More reports on the Nguyen's royal trade with other ports in Asia support this assumption. They suggested that "the Cochinchinese king bought the produce of his country from his subjects at arbitrary prices, and sent them to Canton, Batavia and Singapore in five squared-rigged vessels and steamers".[27]
What did the Nguyen court buy in Singapore, having sugar as their main cash? I have yet to find the return cargoes of the royal trade from the Chau Ban, but the Singapore records tend to suggest that cotton cloth being the staple for its export to Vietnam. Cotton was on average 22% of Vietnam's return cargo in the years 1840-44, largest only next to opium, which counted some 59%.[28] A large part of this imported item by the royal ships, I suspect, was to clothe the royal army. Here was what Crawfurd observed in 1822:"The army consists of about 40,000 men uniformly clothed in British broad cloth, officered after the European manner".[29] And this by Wade, a British officer sent to Vietnam in 1855:"The troops and lower officials were dressed in coarse cloth either Russian or British".[30] British cloth however might have come from two directions: in the 1820s it might come mainly from Canton,[31] while by the 1840s it was more likely from Singapore.
This was again something new in dressing the royal army in British cloth. Unlike other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam was never a great market for Indian cloth, in the "Age of Commerce". Silk was clearly used to clothe the Nguyen lords' armed forces in the 17th and 18th centuries.[32] Perhaps the practice of using British product to clothe his army started from Nguyen Anh in the early 19th century or earlier, but what we can see here is that throughout most of the first half of the 19th century Vietnamese troops were dressed in British cloth, something that did not quite fit into the "close-the-door" picture of the Nguyen dynasty.
There were surely some luxuries brought in by the royal ships. In his work Vietnam and the Chinese Model, Woodside discussed how the cultivation of a taste for Western products spread "slowly downward through Nguyen society from the throne itself". He points out that while in the 1820s Chinese commodities had predominated in the "gifts" the Hue court made to its clients, in the 1830s Western goods became more prominent.[33]
Vietnam's direction of official trade with Singapore might also have come from the frustrations of the Nguyen court with the Chinese court's stern attitude, towards the route Vietnam paying tribute. Tribute is well known as a disguised form of trade between Southeast Asian countries and China, and in Vietnam's case it had always been carried out by land. In 1829 however, the Nguyen envoy asked to send the tribute by sea rather than by land, a change in the traditional route. It is obviously a much easier and more effective way to conduct this form of trade for the Nguyen court, who was situated in Hue, rather than in Hanoi as other dynasties preceded it. The request was nevertheless coldly rejected by the Qing court, who insisted that Vietnamese envoys taking the long and laborious land route to come from the Guangxi border.[34]
This certainly would have encouraged the Nguyen to develop its relations with other directions. A paragraph on Vietnam, written by the Resident Councilor to the Governor of Prince of Wales' Island in 1845 states:
The mandarins who annually visit Singapore in the king's ship, have become better acquainted with us, they return to their country with practical information calculated to impart confidence... I would also record that the several interpreters on board the king's vessels are young men who have been instructed and taught English at the Singapore Institution, there are 3 at present under tuition.[35]
Although it remains a question as to what extent all the factors above helped in changing Vietnam's traditional China-centred world view,[36] Vietnam's connection with Singapore surely embodied something new. I will conclude this paper by briefly considering these new elements and their implications.
Firstly, Vietnam's connection with Singapore suggests a serious new attention paid to a new direction. Never before have we seen such systematic effort made by the Vietnamese court to keep its trade relations with any Southeast Asian countries, in its thousands of years of history. It was only paralleled in its traffic with China, but the direction was certainly new. Secondly, this sense of new direction arose from the Nguyen's sense of the new geographical location of a united Vietnam, unprecedented in Vietnamese history, bordered now between China and the Gulf of Siam. Vietnam's southward expansion finished its territory with its present shape of an S, and marked its final arrival into a larger world of Southeast Asia. This almost made Vietnam a new entity, unavoidably giving it a new outlook. This new outlook however, might not necessarily represent a more liberal open-mindedness from the Nguyen rulers. It might have partly come from a serious consideration of the severe Viet-Siam competitions in the region, itself a product of Vietnam's new locality.[37] Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, I am not suggesting a new "pan-Vietnamese" outlook here.[38] Terrain, locality, regional products and the degrees of abundance of these products all made differences in this context, as we have seen with the trade list of Vietnam-Singapore, discussed above. In reading Chau Ban one can see that clearly there were several voices representing different world views at different times, much more complicated than a single argument of "open or close-the-door" policy. In thinking along these lines, I increasingly feel that more attention should be paid to the themes of the time and place, to see how Vietnam's new geographical location and the increasingly urgent situation of the first half of the 19th century, combined to shape the ways the Vietnamese court operated. The Singapore connection, I hope, is an useful angle for such effort.
[1] For a systematic argument against the conventional view and a new interpretation on the states of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, see Anthony Reid and Carl Trocki, "The Last Stand of Autonomous States in Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1870: Problems, Possibilities, and a Project", Asian Studies Review, vol.17, no.2, November 1993.
[2] For instance, an effort by the Institute of Social Sciences of Ho Chi Minh City in Nhung van de van hoa xa hoi thoi Nguyen (On some socio-cultural issues of the Nguyen dynasty), (Ho Chi Minh City: HCM City Press, 1992).
[3] Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.513.
[4] Crawfurd, Journal, p.513.
[5] Wong LinKen, "Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port, 1819-1941, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, no.9, 1978, p.61.
[6] Crawfurd, p.513.
[7] Norman Owen, "The Rice Industry of Mainland Southeast Asia 1850-1914", Journal of Siam Society, vol.59, pt.2, p.102.
[8] Anthony Reid points out that Wong Lin Ken might have underestimated Siam's trade with Singapore of this period. See Anthony Reid, "A New Phase of Commercial Expansion", in Anthony Reid, ed. The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900, (New York: MacMillan Press, 1997), p.69.
[9] Wong Lin Ken, "Singapore: Its Growth", p.55.
[10] Huynh Lua, "Nhin lai truc trang kinh te nuoc ta trong nua dau the ky 19" (A review on the economic situation of our country in early 19th century), in Nhung van de van hoa xa hoi thoi Nguyen , p.118.
[11] Nguyen The Anh, Kinh te va xa hoi duoi cac vua trieu Nguyen (Economy and the society in the Nguyen dynasty), (Saigon: Lua Thieng, 1971), p.26.
[12] This junk was wrecked near the Paracel Islands and was rescued by an English ship. Public Report Office, F.O. 233/189, no.220, quoted from "Qing dai zhong yie xia men de hai shang mao yi, 1727-1833" (Overseas trade in mid-Qing period, 1727-1833), in Zhong guo hai yang fa zhan shi lun ven ji (Papers on the Chinese Maritime History ), vol.4, (Taipei: Academic Sinica, 1991), p.90.
[13] Ming Qing Shi Liao. Geng Bian (Historical materials of the Ming and Qing periods: Series G), (Taipei: Academic Sinica, 1960), vol.3.
[14] See Li Tana, The Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the 17th and 18th Centuries, (Ithaca: Cornell SEAP, 1997), Chapter 4 ; for Cochinchina and Hatien's trade with Melaka in the late 18th century, see Anthony Reid, "A New Phase of Commercial Expansion", in Anthony Reid, ed. The Last Stand of Asian Autonomies:p.64,
[15] Nguyen Dinh Dau, "Dia ly lich su Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh", in Tran Van Giau et al, Dai chi van hoa thanh pho Ho Chi Minh (HCM City: HCM City Press, 1987), pp.160-161.
[16] Li Tana, "Rice trade in the 18th and 19th century Mekong Delta and its implications", Proceedings of the International Seminar on Thailand, and Its Neighbours: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, International Seminar in Bangkok, 12 December 1994. Published by Thammast University Press, 1995.
[17] Crawfurd, Journal, p.542.
[18] Victor Lieberman, "Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring Southeast Asian History, c.1350-1830", Modern Asian Studies, vol. 27, no.3, 1993 , p.491.
[19] Crawfurd, Journal, pp.541-542.
[20] A Fujianese term for the Archipelago, the Nguyen used this to refer to Batavia and Singapore in particular.
[21] Chau ban Trieu Nguyen, Minh Mang year 5 (1824), Chu Bo Nha tau chiet (reports by the ministries), August to December. Microfilm kept at the ANU Library.
[22] Chau Ban Trieu Nguyen, Minh Mang year 6 (1825), Chu Bo Nha tau chiet (reports by the ministries), January to May. These figures can be added to Prof. Chen Chingho's list of 17 royal ships visiting Batavia and Singapore between 1791 and 1847. See Chen Chingho, "On the 'Ha-chau Missions' conducted during the Early Period of the Nguyen Dynasty", Journal of the Institute of Asian Studies (Soka University), Tokyo, March no.11, quoted from Phan Huy Le, Claudine Salmon & Ta Trong Hiep, tran. & introd., Hai Trinh Chi Luoc: Recit sommaire d'un voyage en mur (1833), (Paris: Cahier d'Archipel 25, 1994), p.127.
[23] "Letter of Resident Councilor , 30th June 1846", Tabulated Statements of the Commerce and Shipping, 1846, p.70.
[24] Chau ban Trieu Nguyen, Minh Mang year 5 (1824), August 28.
[25] Chau ban Trieu Nguyen, Minh Mang year 1 (1820) to year 6 (1825). The price of suagr in 1820 was 12 quan per ta, it dropped to 7-8 quan per ta in 1824.
[26] A quantity of sugar worth $8500 of Spanish dollars was brought in from Cochinchina in the year 1830/1831. See Singapore Chronicle: Thursday July 21, 1831, no.29. This would mean more than 1300 piculs of sugar, at 6.50 dollars per picul for the best quality. See Crawfurd, Journal, pp.544.
[27] Letter of Resident Councilor to the Governor of the Straits Settlement, 19 November, 1844; 15 September 1852; 24 February 1855. Quoted from Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69", Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol.33, pt.4, 1960, p.156.
[28] Tabulated Statements of the Commerce and Shipping of Singapore during the years 1840-1844, p.71.
[29] "Crawfurd's Narrative", in Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue, (London: Archon, 1970), p.251.
[30] "Wade's Narrative", in Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue, p.326.
[31] Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69", p.155.
[32] See "Description of Cochinchina, 1749-50", Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong), 1602-1777, Li Tana and Anthony Reid, ed., Economic History of Southeast Asia Project, ANU/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.70. And Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, chapter Two.
[33] In 1833, for example, "Minh Mang was found bestowing 'Western' bowls, plates, and cups upon some Cambodian envoys to Hue. In 1834 the sorcerers of the Jarai received Western porcelain tea dishes, and in 1849 Thieu Tri gave them 'Western' red and white cotton narrow-sleeved jackets." Alexander Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, (Massachustts: Coucil on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1988), pp.267-268.
[34] Qing Xuan Zong Shi Lu (Chronicles of Emperor Dao Guang), vol.156, from Gu Dai Zhong Yue Guan Xi Shi Zi Liao Xuan Bian (Excerpts of the sources on the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations), (Beijing: Zhong guo shehui ke xue Press, 1982), pp.613-614.
[35] "Letter of Resident Councilor to the Governor of Prince of Wales' Island, 1845", Tabulated statements of the commerce and shipping, 1845, p.117.
[36] A good case to study is Phan Huy Chu's Hai trinh chi luoc. of 1833. SeeRecit sommaire d'un voyage en mer (Hai trinh chi luoc). By Phan Huy Chu, trans. and introduced by Phan Huy Le, Claudine Salmon & Ta Trong Hiep, (Paris: Cahier d'Archipel 25, 1994). Also Li Tana's book review, On Hai chinh chi luoc: Recit sommaire d'un voyage en mer (1833), in Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol.31, no.1, June 1997, pp.256-258.
[37] For example, in 1841 the leading British merchant in Bangkok threatened to sell a steamer ordered for Siam to the Vietnamese instead because of haggles over price. Rama III was so furious that he expelled the merchant therefore made the Bangkok-Singapore trade suffer a big drop. This must have been one of the dramas in the context of Viet-Siam competition over trade in the 19th century. See Anthony Reid, "A New Phase of Commercial Expansion", op.cit. p.70.
[38] See Keith Taylor, "Regional Conflicts among the Viet Peoples between the 13th and 19th centuries", paper presented at the seminar "La conduite des relations entre societies et etats: Guerre et paix en Asie du Sud-Est", Paris, July 1996, p.23.
Li Tana: Vietnam's Overseas Trade in the 19th Century: The Singapore Connection
Source
The original page, Vietnam Journal July 2002, as kept by the Internet Archive: http://www.vietnamjournal.org/article.php?sid=68
More from July 2002 issue.